

JPRS Report

West Europe

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CONTENTS

13 NOVEMBER 1987

POLITICAL

DENMARK

SDP Folketing Leader Bjerregaard Hopes for Ties to SF	1
Bjerregaard on SDP Strategy [DET FRI AKTUELT, 20 Sep 87]	1
Hansen Sees Conservatives-SDP Tie [DET FRI AKTUELT, 20 Sep 87]	2
Scholar on SDP Decline [DET FRI AKTUELT, 23 Sep 87]	2
SF Seen 'Camouflaging' Image [BERLINGSKE TIDENDE 28 Sep 87]	4

DENMARK/GREENLAND

Greenland's New Folketing Member Rosing Comments on Concerns [Jorgen Dragsdahl; INFORMATION, 22 Sep 87]	5
--	---

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

European Concerns About Honecker Visit Addressed [Robert Leicht; DIE ZEIT, 11 Sep 87]	7
---	---

FINLAND

Foreign Minister Sorsa Comments on European Integration [Kalevi Sorsa; HUFVUDSTADBLADET, 19 Sep 87]	9
--	---

ITALY

PCI-PCP Split on European Integration [Augusto Pancaldi; L'UNITA, 9 Oct 87]	12
---	----

NORWAY

Poll on Electorate's Concerns Sheds Light on Vote Outcome [Kjell Hanssen; AFTENPOSTEN, 3 Oct 87]	13
Conservative Party Chairman Syse on Policy Goals [AFTENPOSTEN, 16 Oct 87]	13

PORTUGAL

Poll Shows Voters' Leader Preferences [ESPRESSO, 15 Aug 87]	14
Tentative New Party Tries To Attract Nonvoters [DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 19 Aug 87]	15
PCP 'Old Guard' Blames CDU Strategy for Electoral Defeat [ESPRESSO, 15 Aug 87]	16

SWEDEN

Nonsocialist Parties Under Pressure To Unify Before Election [Sven Svensson; DAGENS NYHETER, 4 Oct 87]	16
Forces Chief Proposes Measures To Improve Officer Conditions [Anders Ohman; DAGENS NYHETER, 20 Sep 87]	18

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Reality of French European Security Commitment Questioned	20
Nuclear Doctrine Seen Unchanged	
[Karl Feldmeyer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 23 Sep 87]	20
FAR Performance Found Unimpressive [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 24 Sep 87]	21
No Change Seen in Nuclear-Based French European Strategy	
[Roger de Weck; DIE ZEIT, 25 Sep 87]	22

GREECE

Combat Efficiency of Purchased U.S. Tanks Questioned [Io. Bitos; I KATHIMERINI, 31 Jul 87] ..	24
---	----

NORWAY

First Helicopters Built in Norway Delivered to Armed Forces	
[Cato Guhnfeldt; AFTENPOSTEN, 15 Oct 87]	26
Bodo Air Force Base To Expand With NATO Infrastructure Funds [AFTENPOSTEN, 16 Oct 87] ..	27
Exercise To Test Capability of Defending Jan Mayen Island	
[Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 15 Oct 87]	27
Nonsocialists Want 3.5-Percent Increase in Defense Budget	
[Thorleif Andreassen; AFTENPOSTEN, 14 Oct 87]	27
Bar Frost Exercise First To Include Women in Combat Role	
[Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 24 Sep 87]	28

PORTUGAL

Comments on Relations With U.S. Citizens at Lajes Base	
[Cesar Camacho; DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 15 Aug 87]	28

SWEDEN

First Woman Combat Helicopter Officer Completes Training	
[Annika Ortmark; DAGENS NYHETER, 29 Sep 87]	29
Proposal for New Army Organization: Cut Back Brigades	
[Anders Jorle; DAGENS NYHETER, 20 Sep 87]	31
Home Guard Adding Platoons for Chemical, Nuclear Defense [DAGENS NYHETER, 4 Oct 87] ..	31
Book 'Nordic Countries and U.S. Maritime Strategy' Reviewed	
[Olof Santesson; DAGENS NYHETER, 7 Oct 87]	32
Columnist Reviews Work in English on 'Soviet' Subs in Swedish Waters	
[Olof Santesson; DAGENS NYHETER, 6 Oct 87]	33

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

Preparations for Oil Trade Deregulation [Nurhan Yonezer; DUNYA, 14 Jul 87]	35
Banks Deregulate Deposit Interest [Abdurrahman Yildirim; CUMHURIYET, 7 Jul 87]	36
Export List of Commodities for USSR [GUNAYDIN, 15 Jul 87]	37

SOCIAL

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Trend Toward Increasing Xenophobia Seen in Nordic Countries	
[Alfred Zaecker; DIE WELT, 23 Sep 87]	38

DENMARK

SDP Folketing Leader Bjerregaard Hopes for Ties to SF

Bjerregaard on SDP Strategy

36130004 Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish
20 Sep 87 p 11

[Interview with SDP Folketing leader Ritt Bjerregaard; date, place and interviewer not given]

[Text] Ritt Bjerregaard is the first new person to take her seat in the Social Democratic leadership and it is a more result-oriented Bjerregaard who is now planning strategy.

[Question] You told AKTUELT on Sunday that there would be an election before Christmas.

[Answer] That was a somewhat offhand comment. But this is a weakened government that has lost 10 supporting votes in Folketing.

[Question] When Schluter now says that he realizes that negotiating with the Progressive Party is the same as signing his own death warrant...

[Answer] Yes, then it is hard to see...

[Question] But then he will have to negotiate with you, won't he?

[Answer] Yes as long as he wants to carry out our policy, as he did when it came to tax reform, then of course we can vote with him, but that is not what he wanted in the past.

[Question] In the past you were skeptical about reaching major agreements with the nonsocialist government such as the tax reform compromise. Isn't the situation different now that the government is so weak that you can count on very big concessions?

[Answer] We must maintain the position that we are primarily an alternative. There is a difference between a Social Democratic and a nonsocialist concept of society.

But of course achieving results is part of Social Democratic self-awareness, one might almost say ideology. At times I have taken a more absolute position on this point than has been warranted. Compromises can blur our profile but it is also part of our profile to achieve results. I have become more aware of that and for example I now think it was correct to reach an agreement on tax reform. Another reason for the great wish to achieve results is that we hold positions of responsibility in so many places on the municipal and county level.

The task is to continue to present ourselves as the alternative while selecting areas where we can obtain so many concessions that our policy is the one that will be implemented.

[Question] Doesn't the current parliamentary situation give us a chance to regain the trust and respect of the Radical Liberals via a policy of aggressive cooperation.

[Answer] Yes, but this should not be done in such a way that we reject the Socialist People's Party [SF]. The alliance, the realization that was also part of the election campaign, that we have an opportunity to accomplish something with SF, must be maintained. I myself arranged a compromise on elementary schools with SF, the Radical Liberals, the Center-Democrats [CD] and the Christian People's Party when I was minister of education. That is where the opportunity lies, not in dropping SF. Not in moving to the right but in maintaining this axis in order to get something done.

[Question] Has anything been definitely decided about the budget bill? During the campaign it was not clear where the party stood.

[Answer] Anker said that of course we would prefer to vote for the budget bill, a statement that Schluter grossly abused. The position we take will depend entirely on the course of events. We will not serve as the government's safety net.

[Question] But you will not state definitely that you will vote against the budget bill if the Progressive Party does so?

[Answer] We would rather not, we assume as a matter of course that those who helped select this government will support its policies. Unless the government changes course.

[Question] Do these strategic considerations have any relation to the discussions you have had about the assignment of leadership posts?

[Answer] They have not been involved in these discussions.

[Question] What about Mogens Lykketoft saying on TV that he was a candidate for the group vice chairmanship because he felt his candidacy provided better representation of the various attitudes in the group?

[Answer] I do not understand what these different attitudes are. I do not understand what the differences in attitude are between Mogens Lykketoft and Torben Lund and myself, for that matter. I wanted to know exactly what these differences consist of, but I did not find out.

[Question] But the general perception, conveyed in numerous newspaper articles, is that Lykketoft and his supporters, for example Bjorn Westh, were more prepared to pursue a cooperative line.

[Answer] I believe Westh stands quite alone on the position he presented during the election campaign with regard to cooperation with the Conservatives. I simply don't believe that he has the backing of Mogens Lykketoft. So I lack examples of what this would mean.

Hansen Sees Conservatives-SDP Tie

Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish
20 Sep 87 p 11

[Text] The prime minister's closest political advisers in the government, party colleagues Ninn-Hansen and Palle Simonsen, agree: Cooperation with the Social Democrats is necessary.

"The message from the election and the bid from the Radical Liberals make it clear that the government must feel an obligation and a desire to enter into serious cooperation with the Social Democrats," Justice Minister Erik Ninn-Hansen said.

"The election strengthened the extreme political wings and gave the parties that shouldered the responsibility in this and previous governments a setback. But of course this can also be regarded as an indication of dissatisfaction with the fact that these parties, which still have the support of 80 percent of the population, have been unable to get together," he said.

"Of course this does not mean that one should ignore the other parties. Here I feel that SF and the Progressive Party have a coordinate position in relation to the cooperation that is needed. Their votes count and they should not be kept out of everything that happens," Ninn-Hansen said.

He said that serious talks should now be held with the Social Democrats, especially with reference to the export package and the budget bill.

Key

Finance Minister Palle Simonsen said that it is hard for him to conceive of serious discussions with the Progressive Party, although he would not rule out any party in advance. "The budget bill must now be discussed by the Finance Committee and then we will have to see." He expects that the discussion of the export package, which the Social Democrats reacted to positively during the campaign, will not take long. The talks about the export package and a new defense arrangement, which must also be pursued with the Social Democrats will probably be the key to reaching agreements in other areas," Simonsen said.

"Three-way discussions about readjusting employer taxes are something we must start on as soon as Folketing convenes and here we are hoping for broad agreement and close cooperation with the labor factions," said Simonsen. "We expect the Social Democrats to take an active part in this."

Scholar on SDP Decline

Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish
23 Sep 87 p 16

[Commentary by Professor Bent Rold Andersen, former social affairs minister; first paragraph is DET FRI AKTUELT introduction]

[Text] "Internally we should be as divided as the fingers on a hand—externally as unified as a clenched fist." That is how an old Social Democratic slogan went. Today things are different. For if debate is curtailed, there will be no renewal and the image of a petrified party will become more firmly established, according to the former social affairs minister.

The lack of confidence in the Social Democratic Party that exists among young people and the new classes of well-educated wage earners is not solely due to uncertain policy. The party also has a poor image. The party of discipline and self-censorship. The party of centralism. The party that is ruled from above. The party that fosters bossism and organizational compulsion.

I have learned from 40 years of experience as a party member that this criticism is much too categorical. There are very different currents in the Social Democratic Party and in the labor movement that exemplify Oscar Hansen's line: "Room for every idea that lives and grows."

But the picture of the Social Democratic Party as a disciplined, centralized and controlled party is definitely not unjustified. And the public regularly acquires new reasons for maintaining this impression. Many people have been surprised that it does not seem possible to get serious candidates to oppose Svend Auken after Anker Jorgensen recommended him. This cannot possibly be because all forces in the party agree that Svend stands alone as the best candidate. The real explanation, on the contrary, is that no one wants to help give the public the impression that the party is divided. After Anker made his recommendation, all others would be regarded as splinter candidates. We emphasize solidarity by backing the candidate who is sure to be elected, regardless of whether he is our favorite choice. Party morale requires this!—And quite contrary to our intention we thus confirm the voters' opinion that the party is a centralistic party that is ruled from the top, with formal but not true democracy as far as its members are concerned.

I remember how as a young party member I was presented with the dictum: "Internally we should be as divided as the fingers on a hand, externally as unified as

a clenched fist." This indicated that we regarded ourselves as being in a conflict situation with regard to the nonsocialists, who in almost all important areas had goals that were the opposite of ours. Solidarity was the major weapon here. Any sign of disagreement would be used by our opponents to drive a wedge into the movement and weaken our fighting power.

The Social Democratic labor movement was built up by workers with 6 years of poor education, who worked 60 hours a week, who were poor, exploited, incapable of managing their own affairs. They did not all have an opportunity to keep up with social issues—although many went amazingly far in this direction. But they had a weapon that made them a political force: their solidarity. They had to let their excellent leaders find the way. And they had to rely on their leaders' ideas and support their decisions. This worked very well and formed the cornerstone of one of the most prosperous and free societies in the world. It is not so strange that we are reluctant to let go of this ideology.

But in the long run one cannot have a free internal debate if at the same time one requires external uniformity. No cheese container is so tight that the smell from the internal debates can be kept inside it. The participants in the debate must constantly consider whether their arguments and viewpoints will become known to the nonsocialist press and used by their political opponents. Pressure is put on the unruly: "If it gets out, Schluter will use it against us."

In the long run debate is curtailed. Renewal does not occur and the picture of a petrified party becomes even more entrenched.

And in the course of time whole new generations have been born. People with different educational backgrounds than those of the pioneers and people with a social awareness and class consciousness that are quite different.

The liberal cultural wing of the labor movement and the Grundtvigian forces in the nonsocialist parties have succeeded in revolutionizing the school system. Consequently there are more and more people who refuse to let other people think for them. They can do it for themselves. These people have well-established critical attitudes with respect to anyone who sets himself up as an authority. These are people who want to take an independent stand on every political issue and who therefore demand the right to agree with the Social Democratic Party on one issue, with the Left-Socialists [VS] on another and with the Conservatives on a third. They do not buy precooked meals and they see no vast distance between a Social Democratic human and social viewpoint and a corresponding nonsocialist viewpoint. Especially not in practical politics where some parties topple others and then pursue the same policy 75 percent of the time. They are not very impressed by the artificially

drawn front lines. And therefore they also move quite freely among parties when they cast their votes. We will repel them if we do not change our image soon in a fairly radical way.

It is characteristic that the population is increasingly reacting negatively to centralism and to being treated as incompetent. More and more people rely on their own efforts. The municipal politicians who let people make experiments and manage things themselves are successful. And it makes no difference whether we are talking about a Liberal mayor in Egvad or a Social Democratic mayor in Ballerup. Look at the number of personal votes they received! The dividing line in Danish politics does not lie between nonsocialists who stress egoism, and socialists who stress solidarity, but between the politicians who believe in and have the courage to count on the understanding and responsibility of the citizens and those who are reluctant to do so. That is exactly where the dividing line lies between good and bad company management. But while the labor movement was among the first to work actively for employee influence in business life, we have been much too slow to step out and demand decentralization in political life, especially in the public sector. Many members of the Folketing group show an amazing conservatism and opposition to assigning tasks to municipalities. Afraid that they will make decisions we don't like. Some of them are run by nonsocialists, after all. Efforts for renewal and to curb the tendency toward regulation in the public sector as well as an emphasis on experimentation run into resistance on the part of our people. These efforts are viewed as nonsocialist attempts to cut spending. When the four-party coalition is in favor of something, we had better be against it. We need to be reminded that when Ritt Bjerregaard was minister of social affairs she was the first one who had the foresight to stress experimentation as a political tool. She made a start. Why didn't we continue to be in the forefront?

The strong tendency toward a gain for grassroots movements at the expense of the parties simultaneously indicates people's dislike of precooked political meals and their desire to make an active contribution to a cause that they support wholeheartedly.

I cannot help asking myself whether these things do not explain why SF has made such strong gains at our expense. Some people think that this is due to SF's clearer class policy. But that does not fit very well with the fact that the Social Democrats stand strongest in the traditional industrial labor class, while SF has won support especially among well-educated people in the public sector—people who are not confronting a capitalistic counterpart. I am more inclined to think that SF appeals to open and critically-minded people who want to be involved in the work and the decisions. For many people SF is a party that is pursuing the 1968 demands for codetermination and coresponsibility. In contrast to the Social Democratic Party.

The restoration of the Social Democratic Party requires a clarification of our attitude toward the new political and social patterns in the population, where wage earners often adopt the position of the well-to-do. Recovery requires that we consistently respect the economic connections in modern society and this means that short-sighted tactical partisan viewpoints must be replaced by a clear interest in the welfare of the nation and the people. The phrase: "We can't stand that" should be outlawed. It conceals the fact that we are unable to defend the correct policy that is needed. Those who can't do this do not deserve the confidence of the voters. Uncertainty and centralism must be replaced by trust in the people. Then the trust will also be reciprocated.

SF Seen 'Camouflaging' Image

Copenhagen *BERLINGSKE TIDENDE* in Danish
28 Sep 87 p 14

[Commentary by Jens Jackie Jensen, lithographer]

[Text] In SF's party organ, *SOCIALISTISK WEEKEND*, Gert Petersen wrote after the election: "The red majority is no utopia. Remember that we are on the way to the next election—it will come before you think."

The party chairman does not seem to be in any doubt: a new election in the near future will give SF the ministerial posts it wants along with power and influence in a labor government, formed by the labor parties, with a solid labor majority in Folketing where a labor policy will be vigorously pursued.

SF is consistently presented on radio and TV as a labor party whose program precisely expresses a pure labor policy.

Even the nonsocialist newspapers have been taken in and seem to have accepted the postulate that SF is a labor party.

As we know a postulate is an assertion that cannot be proved. On the other hand it is sometimes possible to demonstrate that a postulate is an out-and-out lie. Which is possible in this case.

But it might help to clear up the confusion by defining what one means by a worker.

When I talk about workers and the working class, I mean all those—and only those—who are forced to sell their labor from one Thursday to the next in order to earn a living. While they work they produce much more value than they receive in wages.

At the same time they always work under the condition that if the firm they work for does not produce an economic surplus it will go bankrupt, the lights will be turned off, the doors locked and the workers will become unemployed. At worst for a long period of time.

Within the so-called public sector quite different conditions apply.

However there is no wealth that does not come from work. Therefore it is not an exaggeration to say that it is the workers and the farmers and other productive people who create through their joint effort the surplus, all the value that makes up the oxygen and the blood in the whole social body and without which everything would collapse. Whatever is done, whatever is started, the workers end up paying for everything. They pay every time, even if they don't get to go to the party.

That in a nutshell is the definition of a worker.

To ensure wages and working conditions, workers have their trade unions. In the trade unions it is the workers who hold discussions, formulate demands and elect leaders. The same must apply to a political party that claims to be a labor party. Such a party must naturally be dominated by workers, led by workers, characterized by their ideas. How does the "labor party," SF measure up in this context?

If we use the party's own information as a basis, no matter how vague and veiled it is, we see that about 50 percent of SF's 8,572 party members are public employees—primarily educators and case workers. It is said that 30 percent come from the Federation of Trade Unions [LO] area but especially from the Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers [HK] group. It is not revealed how many of them are also actually public employees. The other 20 percent are divided between students and retired people.

The higher one goes in the party's power pyramid, the more public employees dominate.

In SF's new Folketing group, with 27 seats, a two-thirds absolute majority is assured for public employees.

On the other hand there are only two—perhaps three—people who can justifiably be suspected of being workers.

The SF national congress, where the "labor party's labor policy" is fabricated, is totally dominated by people who belong to an entirely different class than the working class.

What kind of class is it that appears under these disguises and camouflage? What does it consist of? What are its goals?

SF is a collection of grassroots movements and pressure groups. In addition to pacifists, communists and drop-outs from the '68 degeneration.

The membership ranks consist to an amazing extent of school teachers, educators, social workers and similar case workers. Precisely the groups that Professor Jorgen Dich in 1973 pointedly and precisely indicated as the

new ruling class. But naturally this class cannot be defined according to occupation but according to mentality and political positions.

A common characteristic of the members of this class is a consistent disloyalty to the society they profit from. In general they respond with an almost gleeful permanent indignation to the unbearable and frightful conditions that prevail in Denmark.

It is this new ruling class that uses and administers most of the funds that are provided through the tax plundering of the people. They are always howling that they are subject to brutal cuts, while at the same time they make higher assessments and use more money.

In reality they are the guardians of the vessel of the Danaides—the bottomless vessel the workers are supposed to fill.

This new ruling class has skilfully managed to exploit and plunder the working class—and to such an extent that even the greediest capitalist would not dare to imitate them in his wildest dreams. Therefore when SF presents itself as a labor party, we are really talking about political confidence trickery of the highest quality. A tremendous deception. A shameless falsehood.

Like any privileged class the army of educators and case workers safeguards its own egoistic interests exclusively. It strives to strengthen its position and increase its power.

SF's so-called labor policy is based solely on pumping and forcing even more tax billions from the people into the insatiable public apparatus.

During the election campaign Gert Petersen said to BT: "It goes without saying that we want to give the public sector greater influence."

Yes that is precisely what it is all about.

Gert Petersen obviously knows the automatic aspect of the law of political development which is just as reliable as a mathematical formula and goes as follows:

1. The size and consumption of the public sector is at all times in proportion to the tax raids made on the working people.

2. The plundering is at all times in proportion to the extent the people are treated as incapable of managing their own affairs. The plundering makes this a logical necessity for the simple reason that people in general do not care for being plundered. Therefore the two phenomena will always increase at the same rate.

3. When this state of affairs is intensified through constantly increased control and zealous compulsory measures, at some point it becomes direct control of society and suppression of the people.

4. When the suppression is begun we are at the preliminary stage of socialism, SF's ultimate goal. The authoritarian guardian state.

This is the content and the course of SF's so-called labor policy.

6578

DENMARK/GREENLAND

Greenland's New Folketing Member Rosing Comments on Concerns

36130001 Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish
22 Sep 87 p 5

[Article by Jorgen Dragsdahl: "Newly Elected Folketing Member From Greenland Wants To Challenge Indecent Cuts Policy"]

[Text] Hans-Pavia Rosing says there will be Greenland life in the Folketing Committees.

When the Folketing meets on Tuesday something entirely new can be expected: a Greenland politician with a markedly Greenland viewpoint, who will become involved as much as possible.

Very surprisingly, the 39-year-old Hans-Pavia Rosing received more votes in the election than the former representative of Siumut [socialist, radical home-rule party], Preben Lange, after a dispute in which he criticized both Lange and Otto Steenholdt of Atassut [moderate, pro-Denmark party] sharply. That happened in a campaign in which "new style" was the central slogan, and in which they were criticized because they ostensibly considered their membership in the Folketing as "an extra job for well-established professional politicians."

In the short term, he has experienced Denmark's "indecent" cuts of subsidies to Greenland, in that he was the government member for economic matters. As a cofounder of the Eskimo Polar Assembly [ICC] and president of the same for the years, 1980-86, he is solidly anchored ideologically in a debate with colonialism and defense of the original people's rights.

One should not, however, expect a great revolutionary stormer of barricades, even though when he is sufficiently angry he can make his ice-blue eyes flash so that one never wants the experience repeated. In Greenland he was compared with a Danish official because of his style, and, even though that was not considered friendly in those circles, the Folketing can expect efficiency and knowledge from him.

He wants to have committee assignments. In the past, Otto Steenholdt has sat on the Foreign Policy Board—unfriendly tongues said “slept”—and Rosing very much wants to get on that board and hopes for an agreement with the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party that will make that possible. He is also interested in the Finance Committee because of “the very important economic relations that we have with Denmark.”

“I believe there will be more life, Greenland life, in the Foreign Policy Board if it is I instead of Steenholdt who sits there,” he told INFORMATION.

At the same time he is the one who has a direct connection with the Greenland Government in which there is dissatisfaction that the flow of information from Denmark on foreign policy subjects goes sluggishly. “I am very much afraid that Steenholdt is also working against the policies of the Greenland Government in the Folketing. He is of course the opposition leader here, and criticizes and works against the Greenland Government in every way, so why should he change colors when he is sitting in Denmark? I believe that it can only be damaging to the policy that the majority in Greenland has voted for that there is a man in the Folketing who works against it.”

Stronger Emphasis

Hans-Pavia Rosing desires progress in the debate, so that Denmark will get a “clearer Greenland policy” and a discussion between all countries and groups which have interests in the Arctic area, so that a policy can be developed for the Arctic area.

“When I used the expression ‘new style’ during the election campaign, that was because the former members of the Folketing did not make themselves known in any way,” he explained. “I am coming to the Folketing because I want to make a more active contribution for Greenland. I want to be more involved in the Danish Greenland debate, which of course flourishes largely without Greenland's Folketing members becoming involved.

“There is a need for the Folketing and Danish opinion about Greenland to be discussed more, and there also should be a feedback to the Greenland people about decisions which are made. The new style should mean that there is a politician in the Folketing who cares, and who has good team cooperation with the Greenland Government and who uses the available resources, including the Danish Office, our men in the foreign ministry, etc.”

Horrible Thoughts

“There is a widespread impression in Denmark that Greenland is a sponger. What will you do about that?”

“I do not know whether that is a widespread opinion. But many ordinary Danes perhaps think in that way. Why should the Greenlanders have so much money? That has been basic to the policy of the Progressive Party. And that has not been correctly countered by representatives of Greenland. But I want to reply again to the horrible idea of our being a sponge on Denmark, as you put it.”

“Why is the assertion wrong? You people of course get enormous amounts.”

“That has of course been historically determined. Greenland was a colony, and when Greenland became an equal part of the kingdom Denmark undertook the obligation to give grants. Denmark has an obligation to a very prestigious part of the kingdom. There are open and clear agreements, including the home-rule agreement, so nobody can question them.”

Agreement Violated

“Will you work for higher grants?”

“Yes, who wouldn't? And I will also. But I have also pointed out to the Folketing Committee that they have cut 334 million kroner from 1979 to 1986, and that was confirmed by the Minister for Greenland.

“In the time of the four-party government they consistently cut down and violated the agreement which was called the home-rule agreement, where it said that neither the Danish Government nor the Greenland Government should lose or gain through taking over areas. But we have seen that the Danish state has scored every time we have taken over areas up here. They have simply, in the expectation that we will take over an area, cut down a little on the Finance Law, so that they could save money on the Greenland account. And I believe that is indecent, and obviously I will work to get that money back.”

“How can you manage that? How can you apply pressure, or is it a purely moral appeal?”

“I can not say just now what I will offer for sale to the Danish Government. I believe that it is a question of whether people in the Folketing, the government, the different parties and Denmark in general have a more modern picture of how Greenland functions today. Unfortunately there are of course still some in Denmark who believe that there are polar bears walking the streets of Nuuk. People have a completely obsolete picture of Greenland society. Many Danes live with the belief that Greenland is a town in Russia, if I may say so.”

Support for the ICC

A current topic of discussion in Greenland is solidarity with the Nordic countries or the Arctic area. Hans-Pavia Rosing says that Greenland belongs to both places, but the "turn to the west" has not been sufficiently prioritized.

Greenland has just experienced a Nordic culture week, during which the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra played in Nuuk. "I felt proud, but also somewhat uneasy, because I thought of the ICC and the debt which I left behind from my time, and which causes the ICC to now scratch at the door for the means to keep going," he said.

Nuuk has a Nordic Institute. Hans-Pavia Rosing would also like to see Greenland get an Arctic Institute which would be "just as grand and lavish as the Nordic." He pointed out that some circles in Denmark see a need to develop an Arctic policy, and if they are serious about it they should also give economic support to ICC.

The possibilities will be investigated closer, but he much prefers that the Folketing undertake economic support for ICC, which is the "grassroots movement which causes the entire Arctic area to function on the human and popular level."

Environmental Strategy

He said specifically that the organization is working on an environmental strategy. "It is something which Denmark and the Danish people will also benefit from," he said. The Arctic area is the globe's weather laboratory. "It will be a fantastic incentive for the Danish environmental struggle, in which all are interested, to open their purses a little."

Last year Hans-Pavia Rosing said in an interview with INFORMATION that Greenland should be the avant garde of the peace movement, and he is now following the goal of the alternative security policy majority.

"I want to stress this point," he said. "We have decided that Greenland is a nuclear weapon-free area, and some will say that that was without cost, because we had no mandate for that. But in view of the steadily rising discussion in Europe about these questions, I believe that we should strongly represent the Arctic area through emphasis on these peace policy issues from the speaker's platform in the Folketing and publicly."

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

European Concerns About Honecker Visit Addressed

36200001 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
11 Sep 87 p 1

[Editorial by Robert Leicht: "Good Germans and Good Europeans? Neighboring Countries Surprised, Worried in Aftermath of Honecker Visit"]

[Text] Does Honecker's Bonn visit signal an end or a new start in Germany; an opportunity or a mirage in Europe? When the two German national flags waved from the chancellor's office for the first time ever a good many people saw their last dreams fade away. And when Helmut Kohl and Erich Honecker shook hands, even those who have known ever since the signing of the general agreement between the two German states that such a visit would one day take place must once more have been reminded of the painful realization which ushered in the new German political relationship back then.

Two German anthems being played in one place. Rarely have rituals sounded a more profoundly meaningful note than these two anthems which both lack a first stanza. After the war, we West Germans deleted the lines "from the Meuse to the Memel [Rivers]." Never again did we wish to be misunderstood in the sense of the "Deutschland ueber alles" notions which had plunged the world into war and cut Germany in two. As for the rulers of the GDR, they grew tired of the phrase "Germany, united fatherland" in their anthem which held out the hope of healing the split. Thus, the deleted first stanzas of the two anthems symbolize the end of historical patterns and deviations. But what words are best suited to describe the future of Germany?

This is a question which concerns our neighbors just as much these days. The INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE is inclined to pardon those Europeans and Americans who react with a "shudder of discomfort" to this German-German meeting. To be sure, no one views reunification as a real possibility or as a threat; but the mere fact that the two German states are moving closer together is raising eyebrows and causing concern just about everywhere. "Rapprochement"—that is the word most often used throughout Europe. Are we on the way to a new German routine, our neighbors are asking—or on the way back to the oldtime enigmas?

The French above all mulling things over—from the left to the right. Mindful of their own transnational francophone aspirations, they are now speaking of a new "germanophonie." Only a handful address their concerns directly to the Germans—like former French foreign minister Michel Jobert who suspects the Germans of seeking to attain a measure of freedom from the Americans and the Europeans. "Germany intends to go its own way in Central Europe," Jobert says.

"This is a people which believes that it has what it takes—based on the FRG's economic strength and its present prosperity—to strike a bargain with the Soviets in order to regain its unity in whatever shape or form."

The Nightmare of Unity

Jean-Francois Poncet, another former French foreign minister, states his view of the Germans in the form of a warning addressed to America. Moscow, he believes, is trying to exert pressure on the FRG via the relationship between the two Germanies and to drive a wedge between the Germans and the rest of Europe on the one hand and the United States on the other. To be sure, these efforts run head-on into the FRG's solid roots within the Western community of nations. And yet, European denuclearization and a reduction of American forces could one day prompt the West Germans to look to the East to provide the security guarantees they can no longer obtain from the West. Even the left-liberal LIBERATION states that there is growing concern about the solidarity of the onetime "American godfather" of the Germans' security shield.

Indeed, whatever movement there is in superpower relations has an impact on the risks emanating from Germany as felt by the other European nations. At the time of the NATO modernization program it was the neutralism of the left which concerned them and in the case of the resistance of the right to the double-zero option it is the undercurrent of nationalism which irks them. What if these two trends should ever join forces? they ask. European concerns may change but they do not seem to disappear. When the Germans were living under the late-becoming unified government of Bismarck's Reich, they suffered from the nightmare of hostile alliances. And now, as LE FIGARO has put it, they are suffering from the nightmare of German unity.

To be sure, the official statements by our neighbors do not deal as openly with the German situation. There is hardly anyone who goes as far as Francois Mauriac once did when he said: "I love Germany so much that I am glad there are two of them." Or Giulio Andreotti who said in 1984: "There are two German states and that is the way it should stay." Still, it is equally certain that at heart they all feel this way—particularly at this time—the German-German visit.

At this particular juncture, however, these speculations by the other Europeans do seem rather odd to us Germans. We are experiencing the visit by the SED general secretary and GDR chairman of the council of state as a ritual manifestation and not as a revision of the division of our country. Erich Honecker's sole purpose in coming to the West is to complete the legitimization process of his state. Is there anyone who seriously believes that the SED chief might be prepared to discuss the liquidation of his power base?

The policies pursued by the Bonn and East Berlin governments do not offer any basis for nightmares. The modest expectations connected with the visit (and already by and large fulfilled prior to it) are not at the expense of our neighbors. Nonetheless, we must take their concerns seriously because hardly any of them have their origin in current history. The reunification blather by various and sundry Sunday orators may raise an eyebrow here and there but in fact it is of no importance. More weight must be attached to the historical and structural bases of such talk.

The horrors of two world wars are not so far removed in time that German policies might expect to be given credit for total normalcy. As long as we conduct debates among historians (as we did last year) in the course of which our journalists and politicians attempt to relativize the German past, thereby hoping to normalize it, normal standards will not be applied to us in the future.

Priority for Europe

However the German situation may have presented itself since the birth of the national states of Europe and in whatever direction it might develop in the future, it could not and cannot but be a matter of special attention. Today, both the FRG and the GDR occupy the number two position in their respective alliances which were created, among other things, in order to "integrate" them. Any thought of change and, even more so, any thought of combining their territorial, political and economic potential would be a cause for concern for their neighbors. Both from the European point of view and our own, reunification would point the way back to the situation which, when it is all said and done, led to the division of Germany, i.e. to a power in the heart of Europe which would relegate its neighbors to the role of fringe states of a critical mass and would, by definition, lead to the formation of alliances against the center—if for no other reason than that the more than unstable balance not be upset anew.

What consequences are to be drawn by the Germans and by the rest of Europe from this state of affairs?

To the Germans we would say: Europe must always be more important to us than the political entity that is the German nation. In the future, there can be no progress for the Germans at the expense of the Europeans. The FRG can only pursue rapprochement between the two Germanies in the interest of all the Germans, if it simultaneously furthers European integration, i.e. West European integration and, subsequently, rapprochement between Western Europe and East Europe. Vetos against the West and overtures to the East are mutually exclusive. For a long time, the division of Germany made European integration more difficult. The watchword for now, however, is: only progressive integration makes it possible to mitigate the consequences of division without raising new fears.

We Germans can and probably must live with the division—but not without participating in the European processes. But in participating in these processes, we must never permit ourselves (and even less so in the purported interest of the other Germans) to be driven into a false choice between West European realities and the unresolved notions relating to some mythical concept of Central Europe. The all-European future calls for closer integration of Western Europe so as not to have "Central Europe" become a secret codeword for German national fantasies.

To the Europeans we would say: if your policies continue to grow more nationalistic on the basis of all kinds of national egocentricities, this trend will take hold in the FRG as well. The profit to be made on nationalistic provincialism certainly is smaller than the interest to be paid on cooperation. Above and beyond that, France especially needs to reassess its security policy. Both in its own interest and that of Europe, France cannot afford to wallow in dual doubt—of the Americans and the Germans—and project the resulting dilemma on the Germans.

Honecker's visit to Bonn, which put an end to illusions and at the same time presented a platform for hope, does not place German chances and European concerns in conflict—unless of course we were all prepared to disregard the fact that German concerns offer chances to Europe at the same time.

9478

FINLAND

Foreign Minister Sorsa Comments on European Integration

36500008 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 19 Sep 87 p 10

[Interview with Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa by Marit Ingves: "Social Benefits Must Not Be Endangered"; date and place not given; first four paragraphs are HUFVUDSTADSBLADET introduction]

[Text] Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa wants a foreign policy debate that is closer to people's lives and he wants us to get away from simply debating various technicalities in such things as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] process.

"The military situation in Europe will not be changed by French-German cooperation if it shrinks to a symbolic joint French-German brigade," the foreign minister said.

"It is simple realism to admit that the most important decisions will be made by the alliances, as they have been in the past," said the foreign minister, referring to possible negotiations concerning the reduction of conventional weapons within the framework of the CSCE process.

Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa thinks that Finland cannot allow vital social benefits to be jeopardized in the context of eliminating trade barriers in the course of the European integration process. He pointed to such benefits as worker protection, environmental protection and employment efforts.

An active effort is being made within the European Community to transform EC into a single economic unit. This forces the countries that are outside EC to increase their activity in order to keep up with developments. At the same time a discussion is taking place on military security in Europe both in the context of the CSCE process and between the superpowers. It is increasingly probable that the two superpowers will be able to reach an agreement that will reduce the number of nuclear weapons in Europe for the first time.

A development is also taking place that involves a rapprochement between EC and CEMA, which will probably lead as early as next year to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two big European trade blocs.

In addition changes are occurring in the relations between the two German states, something that has been a central theme of and one of the major bases for security in Europe since World War II. So far one of the concrete results of this development has been the visit of the East German party leader and president, Erich Honecker to the Federal Republic.

"It has been asserted that nothing important was said or that no important decisions were made during the visit—which is true as far as it goes. But I assign great importance to the visit. It dramatically underlined the continued improvement in relations between the two German states that we have been able to observe in the last 2 years. At the same time it also underlined the positive international development. Without that it would scarcely have been possible for Honecker to make the visit," Sorsa said.

"If neighbors have gone around and viewed each other with suspicion for many years and have said unpleasant things about each other in conversations with other townspeople and then one decides to visit the other, it is a very important event. One does not necessarily expect some new and important decision to be made. The fact that the visit took place is important in itself in terms of interpersonal relations. It is another matter that the visit could start a new development in relations as the guest indicated by saying that there were no obstacles to making the border between the German states a unifying border similar to their eastern border. This of course reveals the hopes that exist on both sides," said Sorsa, who would not speculate about the concrete changes the visit might produce in relations between the German states in the long run.

Not Dominant

[Question] What effect does and could this visit and this development have on the other European countries?

[Answer] The German question is one of our central problems in Europe. But in my opinion this does not mean that developments in relations among the other European nations depend on it. There is an interaction between them but—and this also applies to the foreseeable future—relations between the two German states can only improve in a climate where the international situation is favorable; the relations between the superpowers and relations in Europe are more important than the German question.

Debate Exaggerated

[Question] Opinions of the "historic meeting," as it is called, have been divided. Especially in France there have been suggestions that a rapprochement between the two German states was not an unmixed blessing as far as European developments are concerned.

[Answer] Behind the uneasiness we find France's old fear of a German superpower in Europe. When we look back in history the fear has been justified. But in my opinion this discussion is exaggerated. If the border between the German states is to disappear entirely, as Honecker suggested, a great deal will have to happen, said Sorsa, who does not believe that such a development will occur within the 15-year time perspective covered by the interview.

The foreign minister added that he did not consider it realistic to believe in such a development.

No Dissolution

[Question] The German question leads us to the CSCE process. It could not get under way until relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR improved in the early 1970's. According to CSCE principles the process involves negotiations among 35 sovereign states. Is there therefore a long-term prospect that the importance of the military blocs in Europe will diminish?

[Answer] That would be a very welcome development from Finland's point of view. It would then be easier to pursue a policy of neutrality. Our activity is valued more when tension between the blocs is not as great. Then there is more room for common sense, so to speak. A dissolution of the blocs cannot occur unless the need for them is considered less important.

In this case I see no changes worth mentioning in the attitudes of the superpowers. They still regard their allies and their ability to function as crucial to their own

security, said the foreign minister who used the debate that is being carried out in NATO as an example of how the European countries in the military alliance view NATO.

[Sorsa] On the one hand they want arms reduction, they want greater freedom of movement. But on the other hand they are afraid the American troops will leave Europe and they are worried about the increased responsibility for developing defenses.

We cannot know what people are thinking in NATO's inner circles—if such circles exist at all. But I see nothing in the debate that is now being carried out that distinguishes it from earlier debates. French-German defense cooperation has long been forgotten but now it has been taken up again. But the military policy situation in Europe will not be changed by French-German cooperation if it shrinks to a symbolic joint French-German brigade.

Important

[Question] Europe may also have some changes in store if the 35 CSCE countries can agree in Vienna to get going on concrete talks within the framework of the process on the reduction of conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. How important is it to link the talks between the two military alliances to CSCE?

[Answer] From Finland's point of view it is very important. We are kept informed and given a chance to present our views.

[Question] What is the nature of this link? Finland did not take part in and support the proposal Sweden made in Vienna; that negotiations on measures to create security and trust and negotiations on conventional weapons should be pursued under the same roof so that the delegates could freely follow both negotiations. Is that unrealistic?

[Answer] The important thing is that the talks be conducted within the CSCE framework. It is not in our interest to make demands that counteract our achieving this goal. We should be kept informed at all times. It is also important to be able to express ourselves on issues that are vital to us if we need to. It is simply realistic to admit that the most important decisions will be made by the alliances, as they have been in the past.

In the second place it is not in our interest to support any proposal in detail because Finland is leading the work of the arms reduction group in Vienna. As leader of the group it would be improper to do so.

Prejudices Gone

[Question] In the next 10 to 15 years trade in Europe will also be a central theme in the debate. As far as Finland is concerned this primarily involves relations between EC and EFTA and the chances of the free trade organization to survive and exert influence.

(Foreign Minister Sorsa dealt with this issue last spring, when he was still prime minister. He felt that EC is no longer the "specter" that many said it was in the early 1970's. Our line is the same as it was then; as a neutral country we stand outside EC but our attitude toward the market organization has changed.)

[Answer] When I dealt with the question I was thinking of the views that many friends, whom I valued then as I do today, had of EC. The widespread fear and suspicion they had with respect to EC. Now their attitude has changed completely, particularly with respect to the set of problems that was brought up most often and argued most extensively; the question of how to preserve national cultural interests in a situation in which internationalization is increasing. Now people see that these interests are not threatened by EC but that the threat comes from a different quarter.

We view EC with quite different eyes across the board and this includes the Taistoites, said Sorsa, citing Secretary General Jouko Kajanoja's proposal that Finland work actively to bring the two superpowers closer together. The prejudices are gone, he said. But this does not mean that we should adjust our political line, we can continue to try to achieve the greatest possible openness so that our work in both East and West will be equally appreciated.

Only Basic Conditions

Sorsa also pointed out that there will be developments in both markets that will require a new activity on the part of Finland; in the West the continuing trend toward integration in EC, in the East "perestroyka" which decentralizes the economic decision-making process and creates possibilities for freer foreign trade.

[Sorsa] This development is actually in Finland's interest in the long run. It leads to more dynamism in our most important markets. Therefore EFTA must be expanded and utilized to the utmost in negotiations even though a lot must be done on a national basis.

[Question] Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson gave a speech in Uppsala a while ago in which he dealt with Sweden's attitude toward West European integration. What relationship is there between the view Andersson presented and Finland's attitude toward the integration question?

[Answer] Like Sweden, Finland is not striving to achieve unilateral benefits from the cooperation between the EFTA countries and the EC countries. As Andersson already noted as far as Sweden is concerned, when trade barriers are eliminated Finland cannot allow western social benefits such as worker protection, environmental protection and employment goals to be jeopardized.

This question has often come up in the Nordic debate. Many have feared that countries would be forced to make concessions in areas where we in the Nordic region have made more progress than has been made in many EC countries, for example, but also in some of the other EFTA countries.

(Sorsa also said he was convinced that a position on special terms for integration would not result in any problem for Finland or other countries that take part in developing the European economic area.)

In the final analysis the practical work of integration occurs at the company level. To preserve their advantages and their competitiveness firms must adapt their activity to the changed conditions. The state can only create the basic conditions. By that I mean assuring them a chance to get into export markets on the same terms as competitive countries.

The possible changes in relations between NATO and EC and any direct contacts that may occur between EC and the socialist countries in Europe are development factors that are important in the long run but do not change our basic attitude toward EC in any way in the present situation, Sorsa added.

The foreign minister also said that if Finland is to achieve the goals that are now being set an EFTA office should be set up in Brussels. A decision on this should be made later this fall.

According to the foreign minister the office would make it possible to create the right conditions for exerting effective influence at a sufficiently early stage.

[Question] What is Finland's role in the Europe of the future? The foreign policy leadership is sometimes blamed for not being active enough. During the presidential election campaign people constantly referred to the need for an active foreign policy. You yourself are one of the people who called for increased activity a few years ago.

[Answer] The international situation was very tense then. I felt that under those conditions when we were not given much leeway for neutrality policy we ought to assert ourselves.

Now we have the opposite situation. We already have our hands full of work. I mentioned the adjustment to the integration process; we have a new role in CSCE now that Finland is leading the central political negotiation

process. If the next follow-up meeting really comes to Helsinki, it will require great efforts on our part. In addition we are working in various forums for measures that will create security and trust in ocean areas and for the nuclear-free zone concept. We have big projects under way.

[Question] In other words, Finland has an active foreign policy?

[Answer] In an international comparison with neutral countries like Sweden and Austria, I think our foreign policy activity is a good match for theirs.

Involving People More

[Question] Are there Finnish foreign policy issues where the emphasis is placed on different things and are there issues that should be debated and if so, why?

[Answer] I certainly miss a livelier debate. The academic and expert debate keeps going all the time. But we should also discuss questions that bring foreign policy closer to people. An example of such a question is the refugee issue. That is a concrete question that affects all of us. We should take up questions that affect people concretely, that make them take personal stands, that raise disturbing moral questions about what we really should or should not do and get away from simply debating various odds and ends in the CSCE process, for example. These are often things that ordinary people are not interested in.

With regard to degrees of emphasis in foreign policy, for example the interest in preserving our national culture, I do not see the differences that are said to exist. This is a central and important question for us Social Democrats, for example, and it is included in our new program of principle.

06578

ITALY

PCI-PCP Split on European Integration

13160844 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 9 Oct 87 p 9

[Augusto Pancaldi dispatch: "Talks With Cunhal Center on Desirability or Otherwise of European Integration"]

[Text] Lisbon—European integration, the EEC of the present, and more particularly the EEC in 1992 have been and remain the major preoccupation of Portuguese Communists, who perceive them as a course "disastrous"—as Cunhal put it—for the country's economic and political independence. This is nothing new if we recall the PCP's July election campaign, nor is it surprising in a Portugal whose economic fabric is fragile, which

is taking its first "European" steps, which is now experiencing the first repercussions of its Common Market membership, and which is in a way facing the same problems and dangers as the Italy of the 1950's.

Speaking to journalists yesterday afternoon following the first 3 hours of discussions between the two delegations—PCP Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal, Political Commission members Carlos Costa and Sergio Vila, and Central Committee members Pina Poura and Domingo Lopes on one side and Alessandro Natta, Antonio Rubbi, and Renato Sandri [PCI Secretary General, international relations chief, and Central Committee member, respectively—FBIS] on the other—the PCI secretary general said that within the context of a broad exchange of information on the situation in the respective countries and of an initial and limited exchange of viewpoints on international and European matters, the most prominent point of difference of opinion proved to be the EC, the process of integration "which we regard as a valid horizon but which Portuguese Communists regard as a threat not only to their country's economy but even possibly to its independence." This does not, Natta added, affect the quality of the relations that have long existed between the two parties and, since it does not overshadow the values that we share, does not rule out forms of real cooperation on specific issues, starting with the activities of the communist group in the European Parliament.

It would be difficult to find any disagreements between the two parties with regard to the restructuring and all the innovations in the USSR, with regard to the commitment to economic and social renewal. The disagreements, if any, center on other matters. Natta added, "but it seems to me actually logical that historical processes are assessed with approaches that do not always coincide", since they relate to individual histories and cultures. With regard to the USSR, "I would say that my assessment goes further and I believe that the new course constitutes, for the benefit of all leftwing forces, an encouragement and a stimulus for all to deliberate on the topics of socialism."

In conclusion, the hypothesis on which both Italian and Portuguese Communists are working is of cooperation among all leftwing forces. "The aim is the same," irrespective of methods that may differ, just as the situations, problems, and difficulties that each has to face are different.

The PCI and PCP delegations will meet again this afternoon for a more thorough examination of international and European topics. This visit, which returns Cunhal's to Rome 2 years ago, will end in the evening with a public rally at Almada, on the outskirts of Lisbon, following a final press conference.

Meanwhile, considerable expectation—nurtured by the radio, television, and newspapers—surrounds tomorrow's meeting at midday at the Belem Palace, where

Socialist President Mario Soares will receive the PCI delegation. Elected in the second round against Christian Democrat Freitas do Amaral, partly thanks to the decisive Communist vote, Mario Soares is the first nonmilitary president of the Portugal that emerged from the 1974 revolution and thus occupies the seat formerly held by General Eanes for two consecutive terms—the maximum permitted by the Portuguese constitution. On Saturday, the PCI delegation travels to Madrid.

0425

NORWAY

Poll on Electorate's Concerns Sheds Light on Vote Outcome

36390005a Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
3 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by Kjell Hanssen: "Norway Finds Itself on the Wrong Course"]

[Text] Employment is under control in Norway, but otherwise most things are moving in the wrong direction. That is especially true of health care, prices, and taxes.

This information was revealed by a poll taken by the Norsk Gallup Institutt A/S for AFTENPOSTEN during the final phase of the election campaign in September. The responses shed new light on the election results:

Both prices and taxes were obviously negative factors for the government in the municipal election, even though the Labor Party emphasized using both issues offensively. Also, concerning health care, Norway is "on the wrong track," according to the overwhelming majority.

Own Burdens

When the Conservative Party failed to take advantage of the government party's problems, it was because the largest opposition party had its own burdens to bear in this year's election campaign. Furthermore, the impression of existing problems in health care was present before the change of government in the spring of last year.

On the other hand, the price issue appeared in a new phase with the Harlem Brundtland government's policies. As for taxes, the goal of the sitting government is clearly different from that of its predecessor. In these areas, therefore, one must expect that the responses largely reflect what has happened after the change of government.

According to Party

The degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with developments is strongly influenced by the party sympathies of the person being polled. This seems especially to be the case on issues that have dominated the political

debate for a long time. That stands out on the issue of price inflation. A majority of 33 percent in the Labor Party believe that it is going the wrong way. Among Conservative critics the majority is 64 percent.

And, while only a scant majority within the Labor Party believe that taxes are wrong, in the Conservative Party there are 55 percent more pessimists than optimists on this point.

The poll seems to show that views on whether issues have been well or poorly handled depend heavily on how much attention the issues attract. If things are quiet, one assumes that the issue concerned is somewhat under control. This is made clear by the answers to questions about growth in production. Professional economists from the Conservative and Labor Parties can easily agree today that it is insufficient. In the Gallup poll, a majority in the Labor Party and a significant minority in the Conservative Party responded that growth in production is on the right track.

On the other hand, many experts believe today that the government has passed the peak of inflation. But 71 percent of the voters believe that the problems are just beginning to grow.

Burden for Labor Party

What effect have these opinions had on the outcome of the election? For the Labor Party, which now bears the government responsibility, the figures can apparently be interpreted positively: The voters believe that things are going poorly, but they nevertheless adhere to their party. One must, however, remember that the questions were included in Gallup's ordinary political opinion poll for September—and that poll was not involved in the Labor Party defeat. Defections from the party obviously took place in the last days of the election campaign. Then the voters' negative opinions of the general political developments must have played a part.

The questions asked were: Is Norway on the right or the wrong track in employment, inflation, growth in production, housing, and health care?

09287

Conservative Party Chairman Syse on Policy Goals

36390005b Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
16 Oct 87 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Syse Says Conservatives Must Stand by Their Policies"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] "Should the Conservative Party go to the right, or should it go to the left?" The parliamentary leader of the party, Jan P. Syse, answered the question in this way: "A

change in the political orientation of the Conservative Party in one direction or the other will lead to insane problems. The Conservative Party will stand firmly by its policies."

"We will become more healthy," he continued. "We will be more bold, we will go straight to the issues, and we will show that we can change—in order mainly to retain our strength."

Syse recalled in that connection that it is wise to learn from history: "After Anders Lange's breakthrough in the election of 1973, there were many in our own ranks who believed that the answer from our side must be a turn to the right. But the party leadership kept a cool head. We know the result. From 1974 to 82/83 the Conservative Party had a tremendous advance—practically doubled.

Comparison

In that period the Conservative Party grew by more than the Christian People's Party and the Center Party together. "Actually there is only one previous period in our political history to compare this with—the Labor Party's growth in the years 1921 to 1936, when the party's support grew from 21.3 percent to 42.5 percent," said Syse.

He did not want to claim that this rapid advance for the Conservative Party was exclusively due to the party's standing firm on its policies and principles. "But," he said, "I am convinced that it was a very strong contributing factor that the Conservative Party, in a time of great fluctuation and internal dissatisfaction in many other parties, was a steady and confidence-inspiring alternative. The Conservative Party stood out clearly in this period as the best and clearest alternative for the voters who wanted something other than a socialist government—and we will succeed in attaining that goal again," said Syse at the opening of this year's fall session of the Storting.

Unified Party

He has no doubt that the party must unify itself around a political line that the voters recognize as the Conservatives'. "I must remind you that voters who came to the Conservative Party in the golden days of the conservative wave actually voted Conservative because the party was as it was, not because they wanted it to be some other party.

"We must not disappoint them again," he said.

The Total View

"We must also remember that in our enthusiasm after considering the areas that are claimed to be an 'open sesame' for rapid growth. We will be known as a party that has responsibility for health and social policy; we

will also be known for our district policies, and we will look after growth. But the Conservative Party must never be identified with special interests or special groups.

"In our enthusiasm to develop new areas with which to characterize ourselves, we must always remember the basic principles: an economic policy that stimulates growth and creative ability, a social market economy with social responsibility, respect for property rights and for private self-determination and initiative.

"We will hold fast to the Conservative Party's traditional profile as a party that seeks nonsocialist cooperation," said Syse.

09287

PORTUGAL

Poll Shows Voters' Leader Preferences

35420120a Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
15 Aug 87 p 1

[Text] After giving a clear majority to Cavaco Silva on 19 July, drastically reducing the influence of parties such as the PRD and the CDS, Portuguese voters are now indicating very definite opinions on how the political situation should develop: They want Ramalho Eanes to step down as leader of the reformists and believe that the PRD should be abolished. At the same time, they do not want the CDS to disappear or a new political force to appear in this arena, even though they understand that Adriano Moreira will be resigning and that Freitas do Amaral will most likely be his successor at the head of the Christian Democrats. All of this information comes from a regular survey of a representative sampling of mainland voters conducted by the EXPRESSO/Euroexpansao Panel during the first part of this week.

Freitas do Amaral Favored in the CDS

It is worth pointing out that the answers to all the questions included in the polls showed well-defined opinions that broadly concurred. Thus, 73 percent believed that Ramalho Eanes should resign from his on-and-off leadership of the party, and 61 percent of the voters felt that the most logical thing to do would be to abolish the PRD after the poor showing of 4.9 percent of the vote obtained by the reformists in the 19 July election. And, if it is symptomatic that 56 percent of the PRD's own current electorate advocates the party's demise and 71 percent is in favor of General Eanes' departure, it is no less significant that CDU voters have shown that in either case they are more attached to maintaining the reformist structure. Only 58 percent feel that Eanes' decision was a good one, and 64 percent are against having the PRD dissolved.

At the same time, those polled hold an opposite view with regard to the CDS's future: 64 percent defend its existence, and only 29 percent want it to be abolished (primarily PS and CDU voters, and 20 percent of centrist voters said they would prefer to see it disappear). In conjunction with this opinion, 70 percent do not believe it is necessary to form a new party in the place of the CDS (as some leaders in this sector have advocated).

As to the question of whether or not Adriano Moreira should be retained at the head of the CDS, voters are largely opposed to the current Christian Democratic leader: 48 percent are in favor of his removal (a figure that increases to 51 percent of CDS voters), and only 35 percent agree that he should continue to lead the party. Among those recommending the removal of Adriano Moreira, a large majority believes that Freitas do Amaral is the best choice to head the party. Fifty-six percent chose the former PR candidate, followed by Basilio Horta (17 percent) and Morais Leitao (5 percent).

Cavaco Over Soares

There have also been substantial changes in the popularity of the major political leaders, with Cavaco Silva having overtaken Mario Soares in first place. The prime minister received a notable percentage in the popularity polls at 70 percent, followed by the president of the Republic at 67 percent (Soares is still more popular among PSD voters—86 percent—than with the PS—81 percent).

The public image of the party leaders has generally deteriorated since the last EXPRESSO/Euroexpansao Panel polls. Vitor Constancio and Adriano Moreira were preferred by 17 percent of the people (as compared with negative opinions of 23 and 28 percent, respectively), followed by Alvaro Cunhal with 12 percent (56 percent unfavorable), Herminio Martinho with 8 percent (44 percent unfavorable), and Ramalho Eanes with 5 percent (71 percent unfavorable).

Finally, the PSD has now surged forward with an impressive 68.6 percent of intended votes, thus further diminishing the weight of its opponents: the PS's share was reduced to 17.6 percent, the CDU's to 8.7 percent, the PRD's to 2.2 percent, and the CDS's to 1.1 percent.

9805/9604

Tentative New Party Tries To Attract Nonvoters

35420120c Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 19 Aug 87 p 2

[Text] A new party to be called the Portuguese People's Party (PPP) is being formed with temporary headquarters in Porto, according to a report by one of its members on the steering committee. "We want to attract as members the people who usually vote a blank ballot or do not vote," he added.

Carlos Bras, an industrialist, Pimentel Alves, an attorney, and Edgard de Melo, an engineer, are the members of the committee referred to who printed an announcement in the Porto daily paper that termed the PPP "a party for the good, hard-working, humble people of Portugal."

The same announcement invited the people to enroll and to read the declaration of principles and bylaws of "a brand new liberal and democratic party that stands for a model European society and the authenticity of the Portuguese people."

Carlos Bras, a member of the steering committee, said yesterday that the idea of starting a new party goes back to a meeting held in Porto in October of last year, which followed other meetings held in other parts of the country. "These preparatory meetings," he said, "were attended by leaders from various political circles, young people and adults, some of whom belonged to other parties and were disenchanted with their options."

Businessmen, physicians, engineers, lawyers, workers, and students, "people from all walks of life have joined this movement," Carlos Bras stated.

According to the same source, "the PPP wants to attract as members most of the people who file blank ballots or refrain from voting."

Carlos Bras defined the future party as "a force specifically interested in the defense of the nation and the authenticity of the Portuguese people, and in restoring to the Armed Forces the true image of its valuable service in the light of a new political philosophy."

In this context, he stressed that "the movement does not attack any members of the military but, instead, wants to enhance the overall importance of the military as an institution."

Carlos Bras assured that "the official registration of the Portuguese People's Party will take place when the Constitutional Court resumes."

"The PPP," he explained, "will be a party that will favor Christian ideology and the defense of the nation and its citizens, free from materialistic interests and opportunism."

The PPP's symbol is a cross as a central motif, framed by the national emblem in the four corners and topped with a crown.

Carlos Bras emphasized that "the party is still in an embryonic stage, in a period of gestation, but lots of people have been signing up" and that "the strength of this movement is also seen in the meetings that have been held recently in Chaves, Regua, Barcelos, Porto, Lisbon, and the Algarve."

9805/9604

PCP 'Old Guard' Blames CDU Strategy for Electoral Defeat

35420120b Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
15 Aug 87 p 1

[Text] Some top leaders of the PCP's "old guard"—including Jaime Serra, Dias Lourenco, and Joaquim Gomes—view the strategy adopted by the party in the recent election as "totally wrong," and are opposed to the position taken in speeches before and during the electoral campaign, according to what party sources told EXPRESSO.

There are even some members of the old guard who defend the idea that the PCP allowed itself to lose its image by using excessively moderate language and avoiding any strong criticism of the PS and the PRD. These factors, regarded by some observers as "signs of an opening," are what caused the electoral disaster that befell the party, in the view of the older leaders.

At a meeting of the Central Committee held during the week following the election—where tension was rather high, according to our sources—the issue was discussed at length, with some participants insinuating that the PCP was following in the footsteps of the French, Italian, and Spanish Communist Parties. In his response to the sharp criticism voiced by various speakers, Alvaro Cunhal adopted a tone termed as "conciliatory" by the sources contacted by EXPRESSO. In addition to speaking on the issue of a more open policy (with which he seemed to agree), the communist leader referred again to the need to train new leaders, on the basis of the experience of the older ones.

Alvaro Cunhal's speech was interpreted by some of the participants at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee as a guarantee to the new generation that it will be given a role in directing the party.

PCP sources assured EXPRESSO that the election results were like a bucket of cold water in the face of the militants, especially since leaders had been saying that the PCP would gain one or maybe even two points, despite the fact that the MDP would most likely win over a few voters. "Avante!," the party's official organ, had even prepared comparative tables showing the results of previous years alongside the 19 July election results. The political commission decided in the end not to publish these tables.

9805/9604

SWEDEN

Nonsocialist Parties Under Pressure To Unify Before Election

36500010 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Oct 87 p 16

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Moment of Truth for the Nonsocialist Parties"; first two paragraphs are DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] On Tuesday the Riksdag opens its fall session, on Thursday the Liberal Party [FP] will meet in People's Hall, and later in the fall the Conservative Party [MSP] will have its national congress. It is one year before the election, and more people are demanding that the three nonsocialist parties draw closer together so that they can compete for government power.

Before the 1988 election, all three nonsocialist party leaders are saying, "I prefer a three-party government, but first I want a real election victory."

Demands are growing at the grassroots level for the leadership of the three nonsocialist parties to draw together and compete for government power against the powerful Social Democratic Labor Party [SAP]. This since the SAP party congress demanded increased collectivization and refused to allow opportunities for voluntary alternatives in such things as health care and schools.

FP has its congress in Stockholm this week, and MSP will have its congress in Malmo a couple of weeks later. Then will be the first opportunity to read the trends, how the active party people in the two largest nonsocialist parties are reacting to the demonstration of power by the SAP congress.

But clear lines of direction cannot be expected before next year, after the government presents its budget for the election year, and the nonsocialists are forced to present their alternatives in the form of party motions. It is believed that only hard knocks will be able to drive the domestically competing nonsocialist parties together.

New Leadership Style

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson has already, because of circumstances, demonstrated his leadership style. He is an exemplary administrator and compromiser.

If Ingvar Carlsson begins to fight as in his SSU [Social Democratic Youth] days, it is uncertain how popular opinion will react after the emotional revolution caused by the murder of Olof Palme. Discretion and balance, proficiency and objectivity are what the Swedish people demand, at least when the poll takers come with their questions.

In today's situation, therefore, the excellent, knowledgeable, and irreproachable Bengt Westerberg stands out as the natural challenger for the throne. If the political struggle for government power leads to recriminations, MSP leader Carl Bildt would appear to be a more natural pretender to the throne, while Olof Johansson in both cases must primarily concentrate on protecting his 10 percent of the voters.

The role of challenger appears relatively simple for Bengt Westerberg. The government question does not cause any divisive debate within the FP. Everyone appears to

agree that the main task is to lay the foundation for a nonsocialist three-party government and to try to strengthen liberal social influence.

Factual and Excellent

On a number of different issues such as schools, foreign aid, taxes, and health care, working groups have prepared recommendations that are now showing up in more precise form in statements by the party executive to the national congress.

Everything gives the impression of accuracy and excellence. The walls of the People's Hall will hardly sag from the heat of differences of opinion.

The question is therefore whether the FP congress can give Swedish politics the ideological lift that is needed more than ever, and which would give Bengt Westerberg a strengthened position as the nonsocialists' number one challenger to compromiser Ingvar Carlsson.

The hard confrontation between the new liberalism and collective socialism is over, at least for this time. The nonsocialist party leader who succeeds in satisfying the longing for new ideas is fortunate.

It is understandable that none of the nonsocialist leaders are snorting with eagerness to take over the role of engineer of cooperation. Things have always gone badly for the one who tries to unify conflicting wills.

FP leader Gunnar Helen stood behind the first unified nonsocialist press conference in November 1981, when half the nation was enjoying prosperity, and behind the unified statement before the 1973 election, but he received only ingratitude in return.

The Westerberg Effect

In the 1985 election, the MSP leader Ulf Adelsohn turned the other cheek to facilitate the creation of a nonsocialist three-party government, but instead the Westerberg effect took all the doubters by storm.

There is no outstanding leader among the three nonsocialist party leaders, as there was in 1976 when Thorbjorn Falldin was the power behind the nonsocialist election, despite the demands for abolition of nuclear power, which destroyed party ecumenism.

Last summer Bengt Westerberg tried to assume the role of nonsocialist conciliator. Westerberg then recommended that the three nonsocialist parties should put forth a program for the first hundred days of a new government, but he received only snubbing in return. Carl Bildt thought that 100 days was entirely too short a time, and Olof Johansson was generally uninterested.

Only limited unified inputs can therefore be expected, and, instead, a livelier maneuvering around each other to entice the more flexible and unstable nonsocialist voters.

It is expected, however, that in three or four areas there will be some coordination. To prevent increased collectivization of the formation of capital, the nonsocialist opposition is going to recommend some form of abandonment of the wage earner funds.

Instead, perhaps, there will be an alternative, with sharing the profits of industrial firms, a system that is popular with many firms, and in which the salaried employees' union will be forced to respect the opinions of the members.

Family Policies

In the area of family policy a unified position is also being prepared to increase credibility before a change of government. The nonsocialist opposition considers that the social democratic position, extending parents' insurance up to 18 months, is both expensive and stiff-legged.

Therefore, the nonsocialists are going to try to unify on a system with a guardian allowance to parents with children of preschool age, which will give increased individual freedom of choice in child care.

Privatization of state-owned firms and plants is a third point on which the opposition expects to be able to combine on a somewhat unified position, even though there was some wrinkling of noses when Ingemar Eliasson, vice chairman of FP, made the recommendation.

Taxes are a more intricate question, in which all three parties will express themselves to their own expected voter groups.

MSP wants to reduce marginal taxes for those with higher incomes and perhaps reduce taxes on transfers, FP is a bit more restrained and wants to retain the social safety net, while the Center Party [CP] is primarily concerned with injustices in the municipal taxes. For a middle income earner it can mean a difference of 700 kronor in income after taxes, depending on whether he lives in a low or high tax municipality.

Differing Philosophies

Furthermore, the nonsocialist parties represent different philosophies in relation to the powerful Social Democrats. MSP shudders at the thought of holding the same position as SAP, and in such case abandons its own position. Bengt Westerberg considers that he ought to stand by FP positions and be thankful that SAP follows FP policies.

CP prefers instead to attack SAP from the left and believes that will give dividends. So far that is a theory, since CP has lost four elections in a row and finds itself so low in votes that it is a problem to the nonsocialist parties in general.

The most important condition for nonsocialist unity is that all parties approximately retain their share of the voters. If some party should get into trouble the domestic crisis would develop fully.

Nonsocialist voters are deeply disillusioned following the government epoch of 1976-82. Several governments fell, the long benches were many, and the trench warfare was frantic.

The situation is different this time. The nonsocialist parties are accustomed to being in the government. All three nonsocialist party leaders adopted different central positions in government house during the nonsocialist government epoch, even though only Olof Johansson assumed the dignity of a cabinet position.

This means that the difficulties of changing the government should probably be less then they were in 1976.

Fewer Prejudices

Certain previously held opinions have also been cleansed out of the world of political thought. Some of these are that a nonsocialist government must follow social democratic policies and that a nonsocialist government must automatically have difficulties with the labor union movement. In the latter case experience indicates that, while a nonsocialist government has certain difficulties with the unions, a social democratic government has other problems, especially related to taxes and the funds question.

But most important of all is that a new nuclear power crisis can not be built into a new nonsocialist three-party government. All the nonsocialist parties learned that lesson the last time, even the decried Olof Johansson.

Psychologically, another important change has entered in. Nonsocialist party leadership no longer believes in so-called political cannibalism. All three nonsocialist parties are respected for their individuality, and they all must conduct a respectable election campaign in order for the change of government to become a reality.

Unusual Bad Luck

Disillusioned nonsocialist voters can also derive consolation from another fact. When in 1976 it was finally time to march into the stewpots of Government House, the nonsocialist opposition had unusual bad luck. The Palme government had, during the first half of the 1970's, purchased labor peace at too high a price, and then the oil crisis and the high cost of dollars added to the problems.

This caused the national budget deficit to soar, but if truth be told the nonsocialist heads of government and finance ministers were entirely too easygoing. Even if there are no economic celebrations on the horizon, history will hardly repeat itself in this area.

09287

Forces Chief Proposes Measures To Improve Officer Conditions

36500002a Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
20 Sep 87 p 9

[Article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] A shorter training period and faster promotions with no loss of competence are among the methods advocated by OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] Bengt Gustafsson for improving the situation of career officers in the Armed Forces.

This is revealed in a proposal submitted to the government by the OB. The personnel situation in the Armed Forces is described as serious. The wartime organization lacks company commanders in the Army and qualified system operators. The same shortage exists in the Navy and the Air Force.

OB Bengt Gustafsson writes: "In the Army, it is not possible to provide basic training of the required quality for a desirable number of conscripts."

The personnel squeeze has hit the Navy so hard that it has become difficult to train the units and maintain incident preparedness at the same time.

The Air Force is suffering from the same problem. It is difficult to maintain a high level of incident preparedness while simultaneously increasing training both for flight units and for tactical control units.

Some steps have already been taken to improve the situation. The purpose of the current proposal is to change the training system for career officers in order to improve the personnel situation.

The OB wants the current command system to be made more flexible so that it will be better adapted to the branches of the service.

The total amount of academic training for a career officer will be reduced, and, after graduation from officers' college, training will focus more heavily on the officer's wartime duties.

A greater share of an officer's training for peacetime duties will take place in the units.

The qualifications required for acceptance as a career officer candidate will be reduced, thus saving time. The OB calculates that, eliminating the requirement for a

second and third language and the history requirement, along with other minor adjustments, will save from 150 to 200 man-years. At the same time, the English requirement for entrance into advanced courses at the War College will be increased from 2 to 3 years.

The OB has already made those decisions. He is authorized to do so by the regulations.

The OB wants to establish a few principles governing the level of competence following graduation from officers' college, the War College, and the Armed Forces Staff College.

Cadets at an officers' college will become second lieutenants. That will be followed by 2 years of further training in a peacetime unit. The officers will receive practical

training for wartime positions while also being trained in special areas. Successful second lieutenants will be promoted to first lieutenants and may be sent to the War College.

Better Adapted

General or specialized courses at the War College will provide more thorough command training and training in special areas. Successful students will become captains, a rank that will involve about 1 year of well-attested practical service as platoon executives.

"This means that training will be better adapted to the needs of the OB and the Armed Forces," says Lieutenant Colonel Bertil Kristensson of the Defense Staff's Personnel Development Section. Special training will also be given greater importance in the reform.

11798

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Reality of French European Security Commitment Questioned

Nuclear Doctrine Seen Unchanged

36200011 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Sep 87 p 13

[Article by Karl Feldmeyer: "Much Ado About the Exercise 'Kecker Spatz'"/The German-French Man-
euver and the Security of the FRG]

[Text] These days, within the framework of the fall maneuvers, two large-scale exercises are taking place in the FRG: "Certain Strike" in the north, and "Kecker Spatz" [Bold Sparrow] in the south. With 78,000 and 80,000 soldiers, respectively, they are about the same size. But the public directs its attention mainly to the south. In the north, on the other hand, experts are crowding in to observe the event that would be important for the FRG in case of war: intervention by the 3rd U.S. Army Corps in the north German battlefield.

In peacetime, only a single brigade of this Army Corps is present at Garlstedt near Bremen. It is part of the 2nd U.S. Tank Division. The other two brigades of this division, like the other units of the 3rd Corps, are stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. In past weeks, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the "Air Combat Brigade," equipped with the most modern antitank helicopter, the "Apache 64," as well as the men of the 45th Infantry Brigade of the Oklahoma National Guard, were brought by planes and ships to this maneuver in the FRG. Within the framework of the annual "Reforger" exercise, 35,000 men and 480 vehicles crossed the Atlantic in order to occupy their corps strip at the NATO front in northern Germany. The exercise is planned in such a way that the U.S. units arrive only after the start of the attack. In a counterattack, they must advance beyond the thin lines of the German 1st Tank Division, which can offer only delaying action to the attacker, in order to take over from the German frontline units. The importance of this exercise is indicated by the presence of 500 observers of the maneuver—among them the chairman of the NATO Military Commission, General Altenburg; the new NATO commander in chief, General Galvin; the inspector general of the German Army, Admiral Wellershoff; and the British, Dutch, and German defense ministers. Unlike "Certain Strike," "Kecker Spatz" is not a part of the NATO series of exercises ("Autumn Forge"). The allies, who integrated their armed forces in NATO and made them available for the forward defense of the FRG, are not participating in it, but rather, only French troops. France under De Gaulle took its armed forces out of NATO military cooperation and does not take part in the forward defense; the French 2nd Corps is stationed in the FRG only on the basis of a bilateral agreement. In case of war, its employment would not be carried out by a high NATO commander within the framework of the alliance

defense planning, but under orders by the chief of the French general staff in accordance with the president. Its task is not primarily the defense of the FRG, but the protection of France. That is a difference, although it does not have to be a contradiction. The French 1st Army, with its three corps, has the task of "forcing the enemy to use his forces to such an extent that his intentions become clear, and to give the government enough time to decide on a possible nuclear counterattack....The 1st Army directs its operation on land within this framework...presents nuclear firing plans for the prestrategic stage, and coordinates the use of its nuclear weapons."

Participation by the French Army in the forward defense would make it impossible to fulfill this task. This also holds true for the 2nd Corps of this Army, stationed in the FRG. Despite all efforts, it holds true to this day that the units of the 1st Army can participate in the defense of the FRG only to a narrowly limited extent. If the attacker were to succeed in breaking through the NATO defense lines, and his attack columns were to reach the western half of the FRG, the 2nd Corps could make itself available as an operative reserve, but even then only if all other NATO troops were already engaged and the NATO commander for Central Europe were without further reinforcements. This is the result of France's insistence on its autonomous defense, which integrates nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons for use in its military arsenal.

Since De Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO, German-French military cooperation has not gone beyond the battalion level. This changed only after Federal Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand adopted a pertinent resolution in February of last year. In 1986, German and French units jointly exercised for the first time at the division level; this year, a joint maneuver at the corps level is taking place for the first time. With almost 80,000 soldiers, 55,000 Germans and over 20,000 Frenchmen, it is one of the largest maneuvers in a long time.

The planning of the "Kecker Spatz" maneuver indicates a case of threat that fills Germans with particular malaise: the possibility that, in case of an attack, the Warsaw Pact would disregard Austria's neutrality and could rapidly penetrate west through the open Danube valley. This would lengthen the defense front by about 400 kilometers—and NATO does not have the necessary troops. The fact that the maneuver is not being held where, in case of war, the defense would have to take place—namely in the southeastern corner of the FRG, but rather much further west, in the Neuburg-Ingolstadt area—is due not only to diplomatic considerations vis-a-vis Austria. It is due also to considerations vis-a-vis France, for whom the Munich-Nuremberg line is of political and strategic importance, not only because of the supply range of the French 1st Army—it isn't even participating.

The troops supplied by France for this maneuver are part of the "Force d'action rapide" (FAR), the rapid action force of the French Army. Its purpose is for global use, in Chad as well as in Somalia, Guyana, Tahiti, or New Caledonia. Its use is for the protection of French interests, not the protection of the existence of France—that distinguishes it from the 1st Army.

The maneuver plan provides for the use of French units, equipped with helicopter gunships, light armored vehicles, antitank missiles, and howitzers, to support German tank and armored infantry units on the southern bank of the Danube. They contribute to defeating the attempt of a large-scale encirclement of the defenders' left flank, and halting the advance of the attackers. The maneuver ends with a fiction, namely, "Phase IV": after the counterattack was successful, Kehlheim was reconquered, and the enemy has been driven back behind the border, the French 2nd Corps replaces the FAR in its positions in the battle line along the eastern border. This phase is also a political fiction. The German wish, that France might no longer distinguish between its own security and that of the FRG and share its last means for the protection of its own existence with the FRG, is unfulfillable for the foreseeable future.

The Thursday appearance of President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl at the maneuver area could nurture the assumption by the public that in future, German security would be primarily ensured by cooperation with France. But that would be wishful thinking. The security of the FRG is primarily decided by the security alliance with the United States. This alliance needs nurturing; a short visit by the chancellor to the Reforger troops would, therefore, have been desirable.

FAR Performance Found Unimpressive

36200011 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Sep 87 p 6

[Article by fy., Ingolstadt: "Almost Nothing Works Well in the 'Kecker Spatz' Maneuver"/ Generals Altenburg and Galvin Disinvited/ "No Change in France's Military Strategy"]

The chairman of the NATO Military Commission, General Altenburg, and the new NATO commander in chief for Europe, U.S. General Galvin, who had intended to pay official visits to the German-French maneuver, "Kecker Spatz," were disinvited by the German Army upon French intervention. This became known on Wednesday in Manching near Ingolstadt, where army inspector General von Sandrart and the deputy commander of the French 1st Army, General de Bellecombe, spoke to journalists about the plan and execution of the maneuver. The exercise "Kecker Spatz" is the first joint maneuver of German and French army units at the corps level. More than 20,000 soldiers of the "Force d'action rapide" of the French Army, and 55,000 soldiers of the

German Army participated in it. Since France does not belong to the military organization of NATO, the exercise is taking place bilaterally and outside the maneuver series of "Autumn Forge."

When questioned by journalists, the spokesman for the Army, Lt. Colonel Widder, avoided explicitly confirming the disinvitation of General Galvin. But he also could not deny it. Widder said that the German side had pointed to the bilateral character of the exercise "Kecker Spatz" and had asked the NATO representatives to visit the exercises "Goldener Loewe" [Golden Lion] and "Certain Strike," which are part of the NATO maneuver series, "Autumn Forge." Unofficially, however, it was learned that, a few days before the start of the exercise, the Defense Ministry under French pressure withdrew the invitations issued to the chairman of the NATO Military Commission, General Altenburg, and to NATO commander in chief for Europe General Galvin. They had been based on a list of persons to be invited as official guests, coordinated and agreed upon with France. Both Altenburg and Galvin had been on the list.

Although there is great official reticence in evaluating this event, it is evident that this occurrence will overshadow for some time the relationship of the FRG with its partners cooperating in the NATO military organization, particularly with the United States. The French interest in clearly separating the maneuver from NATO was felt from the very beginning. Among other things, it prevented the participation of smaller U.S. troop contingencies.

Talking to journalists on Wednesday, de Bellecombe had prefaced his statements with the declaration that France's willingness to have troops of the "Force d'action rapide"—intended for global use—participate in the maneuver did not mean a change in the French defense concept toward participation in the forward defense of the FRG.

"How Will the Maneuver Leadership Explain the Success?"

While the German side repeatedly called the maneuver a proof of France's willingness and capability "to participate in the forward defense" of the FRG, General de Bellecombe made a very different statement. He averred that the maneuver concerned improved military cooperation. But the French defense concept was not altered by that. It rests on the independent nuclear deterrent of France. The general said that participation in the maneuver by the rapid action force should be seen as a "spearhead" of the 1st Army in the maneuver. The fact that he, as the deputy commander of this Army, was given command of the maneuver troops underlines this statement.

In order to counteract misunderstandings among the public about the mission of the French 1st Army, the information packet given to journalists explicitly

pointed out that "the essential task" of the 1st Army consists in "forcing the enemy to use his forces in such a way" as to make it clear whether his intentions are directed against France herself and to allow the government in Paris enough time "to decide on a possible nuclear counterattack." The press information states further that, "within the national framework, it directs its situation operations, presents nuclear firing plans for the prestrategic phase, and coordinates the use of nuclear weapons." De Bellecombe stated, however, that nuclear weapons were not included in this exercise. The general's remarks were remarkably open with regard to the technical difficulties to be mastered by his units in the maneuver, as well as what he said about the German-French brigade mentioned by Chancellor Kohl. De Bellecombe was of the opinion that such a project was too expensive just to establish a showpiece unit.

The determined attitude of the French, which is obviously in the way of the obvious German effort to create the appearance of a beginning joint defense, had already been recognized and discussed before the onset of the maneuvers at the leadership level of the Army. General Lange, in charge of the maneuver, had informed the inspector of the Army at the end of August that the French "had very decided ideas of their own" regarding anything with an effect on the public. As examples, he mentioned not only press information data, but also invitations and exercise symbols for the maneuver. No final judgment was available on Wednesday on the course of the maneuver, but impressions and first evaluations were there. German participants called French reserve, also in its contact with the population, striking. In addition to language difficulties, the training and task-setting of these units intended for global use outside of France were mentioned as reasons for this reserved attitude. This may also be of importance for the quality of military cooperation, which is described as being in great need of improvement.

"Almost nothing works out," was the unanimous internal assessment by several German officers. Intelligence gathering in particular is considered unsatisfactory. The extent of cooperation problems became evident on Tuesday afternoon when the French were to halt the armored breakthrough by "Red" south of the Danube. Since the antitank helicopters were not in position in time, upon orders of the maneuver leadership the "tank breakthrough" in the direction of Aichach was stopped at about 1500 hours. Although the tanks had to wait for hours in open terrain, according to eye witnesses, the antitank helicopters had still not discovered them by 1900 hours. It was said on Wednesday, "Now we are only curious to see how the maneuver leadership will justify in the end its evaluation that it succeeded in halting the tank breakthrough and throwing back the enemy."

No Change Seen in Nuclear-Based French European Strategy

36200010 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German
25 Sep 87 p 7

[Article by Roger de Weck: "Paris and NATO—Must a Battle First Be Lost? France's Nuclear Ambitions Weaken Its Conventional Armed Forces"]

[Text] The "rapid deployment force" is seeing action for the first time in Germany. Twenty thousand men of this French elite formation crossed the Rhine River and are now practicing for war. The scenario: The Soviets are invading the Federal Republic; France dispatches its rapid action forces (FAR), which hasten to assist and carry out a counterthrust to relieve the Bundeswehr. The exercise, code-named "Cocky Sparrow," is the largest Franco-German maneuver since the time that soldiers of both countries have no longer stood opposed to each other but rather stand on the same side.

For 5 days—until the termination of the exercise on Friday—the French intervention forces are under the supreme command of a German lieutenant general. What is even more remarkable with respect to Operation Daring Sparrow is the fact that the French have been fighting at the most forward frontal areas since shortly after the onset of "hostilities." The maneuvers are intended to demonstrate that France would not for long remain inactive in the event of war, but would engage in solidarity despite the fact that it left the military NATO alliance in 1966 and has no desire to station troops far forward along the eastern border of the Federal Republic in peacetime.

Better to have a cocky sparrow in the hand than nothing. However, can the French be truly relied upon? What is their assistance worth? How good are their conventional armed forces? Anyone who keeps his eyes and ears open reaches the conclusion that the German public does not have an especially high opinion of the French Army—historical reminiscences mixed with harsh criticism of current conditions. In 1940 the French failed in the face of Hitler's Wehrmacht; in 1945 France lost the war in Indochina; and the Algerian war from 1954 through 1962 was no page of glory in French history. And today France is criticized for the emaciation of its conventional armed forces in favor of its nuclear Force de Frappe.

From the German standpoint, developments have been going in the wrong direction for the past three decades. A truly strong French Army would contribute far more to the security of the Federal Republic than all the French atomic bombs that protect only France.

That is the mood. Now the facts: Without the French hinterland, the Federal Republic cannot be defended, at least not for long and not efficiently. That is because it creates an all-too-narrow corridor. "It is a little more than 300 km from the Thuringen Forest to Strassburg."

a fact of which the French military is all too well aware. If an assault is to be defended against with conventional weapons, NATO needs the French harbors and airfields, the communications, and railroad lines for resupply purposes. This is a subject that was discussed and is being discussed, and France and NATO have made agreements that are being kept secret.

Why? It would be a welcome signal of solidarity with the Federal Republic if Paris would openly announce that, in the event of need, NATO could have recourse in France to ammunition depots. More than 20 years after dropping out of the military alliance of the North Atlantic Pact, no French politician can as yet afford to publicize close cooperation with NATO and to accept responsibility for it. Many Frenchmen still harbor the mendacious hope that their country could stay clear of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

At that, the French Armed Forces are an unrenounceable and not-to-be-underestimated action reserve of NATO. Although France does not share in the forward defense of the Federal Republic, its land forces must "be in the position to intervene in the conflict during the first days, if not during the first hours," according to Francois Fillon, the young chairman of the Defense Committee of the National Assembly. Similar sentiments were expressed by General Francois Valentin, former commander of the 1st Army. Even before France declares itself, units should be transferred across the Rhine River in order to reinforce French troops stationed in the Federal Republic. Gen Valentin says: "It looks as though these recommendations have been best understood by the politicians."

Really? Other pronouncements create doubt with respect to French reliability and obligingness. In a parliamentary bill submitted on the occasion of the construction of the Franco-German combat helicopter, the following statement was contained not a year ago: "The hypothetical situation, according to which the French Army would intervene in the European theater with conventional weapons, would ensue if, during the first phase of forward defense, the NATO forces had lost the battle." Does the French partner offer to help only if NATO is in need and if it is possibly already too late?

Nevertheless, France and NATO have long since agreed "through to minute detail" how their conventional armed forces could cooperate in the event of war—provided that the president of the Republic in Paris was truly prepared to resort to the use of weapons. French General Ailleret and his American NATO colleague, Lemnitzer, struck the first agreement of this kind in August 1967, which concerns the possible warning for the use of French troops stationed in the Federal Republic who, in the event of a counterattack, would be subordinated to the NATO command. The so-called Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreement was then followed by the Valentin-Ferber agreement (covering the use of the 1st Army—in other words, the bulk of the French fighting

forces), the Fourquet-Goodpaster agreement (on the air force), the Allen-Delaval agreement (covering communications). Both sides report "good" cooperation. Of course, similar precise agreements regarding the use of the "rapid deployment force" are missing.

What is it that France now really offers by way of contributing to the conventional defense of the Federal Republic? In essence it is the following:

- The barely 130,000 men of the 1st Army—three corps with a total of 10 divisions, two of which have limited combat value. Following a certain startup time, the I Corps in eastern France could provide infantry assistance for NATO. The II Corps encompasses the some 44,000 men stationed in southern Germany; one division, however, is housed in the city of Limoges, some 600 km distant, but NATO can rely on the II Corps. Things are more difficult with regard to the less mobile III Corps, which protects northern France.
- The "rapid deployment force": five divisions, with a total of 47,000 men, of whom, however, as is the case now during Operation Daring Sparrow, only some 20,000 would be available.

The question arises whether France could simultaneously commit the 1st Army and the "rapid deployment force" in combat. Would the logistics and the air support be adequate for this purpose? The conventional armed forces are not exactly magnificently equipped. All in all, the French Army does not even have half of the significant, and possibly combat-deciding, large equipment (tanks, heavy artillery) that is available to the Bundeswehr. It is not a question of the French spending less than the Germans for defense. But the nuclear Force de Frappe consumes enormous outlays—a good one-third of all armaments expenditures—which the conventional arms of service painfully miss.

According to French military doctrine, the conventional armed forces are only an appendage of the nuclear forces: "Our plan rejects the concept of a longer-lasting struggle involving conventional means." The army is intended only to defend against "minor" assaults (attaches mineures) to gain a little time and to "test" the enemy until such time as the president of the Republic has recognized his intentions and resolved to launch a nuclear warning strike. The army is intended to render resistance for a few days and to thus force the enemy to concentrate his assault troops in such a way that they can be destroyed by the nuclear warning strike; furthermore, according to defense politician Fillon, participation of the conventional armed forces is to be facilitated in such a manner that, following the termination of the conflict, France would participate "with full rights in the (peace) negotiations."

The conventional army has more subordinate and "political" tasks assigned to it. Priority is assigned to the Force de Frappe, a fact which is once more documented

by the armaments program over the next few years. Until 1990, expenditures for nuclear matters amount to somewhat more, and expenditures for conventional matters amount to somewhat less, although in 1991 a correction is to take place in favor of conventional armaments, but, for the most part, what is true is that the money is insufficient anyway and that the armaments program will not be adhered to, and, primarily, savings are achieved at the expense of conventional armaments.

Added to this is the fact that the modest means for conventional armaments are intended not only for defense in Europe but also to maintain the French presence throughout the world, specifically in Africa. The intervention in Chad costs billions, as, for example, does the operation of the military support point at Djibouti.

Thus, the parliamentary report on the armaments program reads, in part, like an indictment. The anticipated status of French armament in 1991 looks like this: 1,100 tanks (four times fewer than the Bundeswehr)—half of them obsolete; 500 guns—one-third "poorly suited" for use in Europe; 500 helicopters—an "insufficient" number. And, at best, "only about 100 aircraft for air support of the ground forces," provided one detaches the combat aircraft assigned to the navy. And what about this navy that would be the easiest of all the arms of service to integrate in NATO? In 1977 it had 175 ships; in 10 years it will have only 110, of which half should rightfully be turned over for salvage purposes.

Because finances are inadequate and the governments, irrespective of color, do not wish to forgo large prestigious projects such as the construction of an aircraft carrier, the French Army is increasingly made dependent on its partner for "secondary" items: for purposes of committing the "rapid deployment force," it is dependent on logistic support by the Bundeswehr; for purposes of intervening in Africa, it depends on American transport aircraft; for security of the French Fleet in the Persian Gulf area, it is dependent on American air surveillance.

In the French Armed Forces, the most modern equipment such as the RITA telecommunications system coexists side by side with antedeluvian materiel. Even high-ranking Swiss officers feel that their confederate troops are "head and shoulders above" the 1st French Army. Is this a picture of misery?

It must be corrected, particularly when one considers that the French Officer Corps forms an elite which, with a typical French wealth of imagination and a dose of improvisation, is obtaining a maximum in performance from inadequate means. Furthermore, the generally accepted concept that there is a lot of loafing in the French Army has been exaggerated. Training is once more hard, and the crews are achieving a high level.

The high motivation of the officers and soldiers is all the more astounding if one considers that, during the post-war period, there have already been five large army reorganizations. This reformitis is naturally an expression of a malaise. The most recent example of this was provided by the "rapid deployment force." At the expense of the 1st Army, this heterogeneous formation was established in 1983 as an independent multiple-use unit. Currently, the tendency is again to gradually attach the "rapid deployment force" to the 1st Army.

The Franco-German maneuver Operation Cocky Sparrow, as well as the planned Franco-German brigade, nevertheless has a pleasant side effect over and above its political or military significance: Upon German request it works for strengthening the conventional French Armed Forces. While the latter are short of practically everything, daring voices are already being heard in France that question the purpose of expensive nuclear short-range rockets that would impact in Germany. Is it worthwhile to make up for conventional weakness with Hades rockets, neutron bombs, and chemical weapons and, at the same time, to scare the German partners? At Matignon, the official seat of the Gaullist premier Jacques Chirac, there is a greater preference for such types of weapons as is the case at Elysee, where the socialist president Francois Mitterand resides.

Is it possible to achieve savings in nuclear weaponry over the next few years that could be assigned to conventional matters? Is it possible to transfer the French formations and territorial troops, which are predominantly deployed throughout their own country, a little more to the east? In this way France would gain in weight as a security partner for the Federal Republic.

05911

GREECE

Combat Efficiency of Purchased U.S. Tanks Questioned

35210164 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek
31 Jul 87 p 7

[Article by Io. Bitos, retired general]

[Text] Minister of Defense Kharalambopoulos referred in a recent statement to the purchase of 300 tanks of the M48-A5 series, which now belong to the U.S. National Guard. They will be paid, he said, by FMS appropriations and they will be obtained at a relatively low price. These tanks will replace the obsolete M24's and some of the M46's. The same announcement also states that the purchase of those 300 M48-A5 tanks will not affect the program for the procurement of 10 new tanks which is now in progress.

Former high ranking officers of the armored corps believed that our country follows a careless policy especially on the subject of tank purchases; I think this is also

the view of those currently on active duty. According to this view, the number of tanks our army has is disproportionate to its needs; and considering our technical support capability, it also has an unacceptably large variety of types of tanks. Personally, I absolutely agree with them that our army does not need as many tanks as it needs good tanks; and that the large number of types of tanks has a negative effect on the army's combat capability.

But, let us examine the status of the tanks potential of our army as indicated in a publication of the British Institute of Strategic Studies. We have a total of about [number incomplete] tanks of the following classes: the obsolete M24 (Korean War vintage), the U.S.-made M series with the following models of evolution M47, M48, M48G, M48-A3, M48-A5, the French AMX-30 tanks and the German LEOPARD G-1 tanks. In other words, we have eight different types of tanks. Definitely, we hold the world record on this, and we do not take into account that we do not have the technical capability to maintain them in a condition of readiness; this is indicated by the fact that we have to rely on foreign sources for spare parts needed for their maintenance.

More than half of those tanks (the M24's, M47's, M48's) are obsolete and have been withdrawn from nearly all of the armies of the West; the remaining tanks range from modernized (of the M48-A5 series) to modern (LEOPARD G-1).

Although we now have a great variety of obsolete tanks the minister of defense reveals that we are negotiating the purchase of 300 tanks of the series M48-A5 that need serious and expensive modifications and which, in any event, are not modern. In other words, we are purchasing tanks that are two generations old (M48, M60, M1) and which the U.S. Army is currently withdrawing from its TEA [National Defense Battalions].

This is done at a time when the philosophy governing the tanks as a weapon is showing cracks and when other weapons come to dispute the dominant position tanks had on the battlefield. Today's modern armies are studying ways to drastically reduce the number of their tanks, their size and their weight, and they only pay attention to the fire power and swiftness of their tanks.

This attitude prevails mainly because the vulnerability of the tanks is steadily increasing. The air force, the helicopter, the anti-tank weapon, the artillery and the various obstacles (mine fields, etc.) are steadily gaining ground at the expense of the tanks which appear to stand nearly undefended at the mercy of their enemy.

As a proof, I would like to mention that today, there is no armor plate that can confront the new generation of anti-tank weapons (such as, for example, the MILAN and the TOW); equally, there is no armor plate that can protect the upper part of a tank from artillery grenades.

In addition, tests have shown that one anti-tank helicopter (of the COBRA class) can destroy at least 18 tanks before it is shot down (an APACHI helicopter can destroy even more tanks). These 18 tanks cost at least 18 million dollars, while a COBRA helicopter costs only 4 to 5 million dollars. In other words, the ratio cost relationship of tanks and helicopters and their operational effectiveness is 1 to 4 against the tanks.

In reality, we need these 18 tanks only to be able to stand against an equal number of tanks of a possible opponent. Therefore, we could achieve the same results with one helicopter, i.e. with a weapon that is four times more economical. The question is why are we not doing this? Why do we proceed instead with the purchase of weapons that are not only more expensive to obtain but are also more expensive to maintain? How does it happen that we do not become more suspicious by the willingness shown by the seller countries and their obvious desire to get rid of those tanks.

Why is it that the renowned tactical-technical-economic practice of "cost effectiveness" does not apply in the case of the purchase of any weapons systems for our army? And yet, there are quite a few officers, who have been trained in this method. We are calling the current minister of national defense, who, a former officer himself, comes from the technical branch—to pay attention to the question of purchases and expenditures, and to see that every request of the general staff is viewed under this scope. In this way, expenditures will not only be justified by need, but will also be the most advantageous.

Everybody, the government, the people and the armed forces share the same sensitivity when it involves subjects of national defense and will never refuse to make any expenditure or sacrifice when it pertains to national defense. Because such expenditures, however, burden the Greek people, we all have the right to know and to ensure that these expenditures are not only justified, but are also the most advantageous.

Before concluding I would like to discuss briefly the tactical-operational needs of our army in tanks. I too espouse the view of the older armored corps generals that the tactical-operational needs of our army do not require as many tanks as we have today and if there is anything to be added to our tank potential, it should be the qualitative improvement of the means, and not an increase in numbers through the acquisition of second or third generation units. It is clear that our operational needs in the Northern Greece and Evros areas can be met with fewer tanks than those we have today, if, however, the available tank units were of a higher quality. As for the needs of the islands, I would prefer not even to discuss them. The tanks stationed on the islands—and which correspond to tanks the Turks have on their territory across the water are the least adequate weapon to face the "special" threat against the Greek islands.

In a previous article I wrote in the I KATHIMERINI, I discussed the special kind of threat against the islands. The medium class tanks stationed on the islands are extremely vulnerable to the air force, helicopters, artillery and anti-tank weapons of the opponent. The problem is that the battle on the islands will be decided—as it was decided 46 years ago in Crete and 13 years ago in Cyprus—before the tank force of the invader reaches the shores and disembarks. Because the tanks of the opponent succeed in reaching the shores and disembarking neither the few remaining tanks nor even a triple number of tanks would be able to stop the inland advance of the opponent.

Therefore, to defend the islands different and more effective weapons are needed—especially, weapons that can survive longer—and not the heavy, bulky, sluggish and extremely vulnerable tanks.

Finally, we should not get carried away by the great number of tanks Turkey has. We should not be worried by the fact that Turkey has 4,000 or more tanks, because Turkey cannot use them anywhere and it does not have the terrain that will allow it to apply its overwhelming superiority and take advantage of this comparative advantage.

Consequently, in view of the general climate favoring reduction in armaments—even of the conventional type such as tanks—a subject that was touched upon by the prime minister during his meeting with Mr Ceausescu, shouldn't the Ministry of National Defense revise its views on the purchase of obsolete tanks, which are of doubtful combat value, are relatively expensive and would also need costly maintenance in the long run?
8193/12232

NORWAY

First Helicopters Built in Norway Delivered to Armed Forces

36390006c Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
15 Oct 87 p 80

[Article by Cato Guhnfeldt: "Helicopters Were Built at Sola"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Helicopters are being built in Norway for the first time. It is happening at Sola, where Helicopter Service is assembling 18 new Bell 412 SP Arapaho helicopters for the defense forces. Helicopter Service will also test-fly the machines and provide the technical instruction of military personnel, mainly from the 339 and 720 Squadrons of the Air Force, which will operate the new helicopters for the Army.

In a modernized German hangar at Sola Naval Air Station, the main parts of four gold-painted helicopter hulls are lined up. Fourteen men in coveralls are stretching cables, assembling engine parts, and looking at drawings. Over 2600 parts will become a helicopter

worth 25 million kroner, with room for 13 passengers, or eight soldiers with full winter equipment. The first Arapaho flew on 13 October and will be delivered to the Defense Department on 29 October. Before the end of 1989 all 18 helicopters will be assembled and delivered. Then the trip that began at the Bell Factory in Texas will be completed.

The helicopters are delivered as disassembled kits and are shipped from Houston to Goteborg. The Stavanger Steamship Company brings the helicopter parts safely to their hometown. The large containers are then taken to the Sola hangar. Nor are they small items—just the main parts of one helicopter body weigh four tons in the container.

"Parts of the first two helicopters arrived on 7 April," said project leader Gunnar Aga of Helicopter Service. "Since then we have received a shipload per month, while individual small parts have been sent by air. Everything first goes into our 900 square meter storage, which is beside the assembly hall."

Experts

And the men in the hangar know their jobs. Most of them have worked on a similar civilian version of the Arapaho—Bell's model 212, which Helicopter Service has used since 1973. But the Arapaho has different flight control and rotor systems in addition to another fuel system, with self-sealing tanks. Previous helicopter experience paid off when, early in the assembly, a box containing loose wires and another containing loose plugs were unpacked. All the wiring for the helicopter navigation, communication, and radar warning systems should have been sorted and put together by Bell. Now the Sola gang would have to do the job. And the result impressed even Bell's own representatives. Two of them are following the assembly at Sola.

Guarded Against Espionage

The Arapaho helicopter has the newest American radar warning system on the market. The high-technology part of the project also requires electronic warning systems against theft and espionage at Sola. A crook recently managed to get into the assembly hall without an invitation. That was the last time that happened.

The work at Sola is proceeding according to plan. Three weeks' delay earlier this summer because of a shortage of parts was made up during the following two months. In all, it takes five months to assemble an Arapaho, followed by 14 days of testing.

09287

Bodo Air Force Base To Expand With NATO Infrastructure Funds

36390006e Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
16 Oct 87 p 10

[Unattributed article: "Air Force Base Being Expanded"]

[Text] Bodo Air Force Base does not fulfill NATO requirements for protection of visiting aircraft. A billion kroner from the NATO infrastructure program will therefore finance a large-scale expansion, which will include better protection for aircraft. Base commander Egil Omdal told NORLANDSPOSTEN that the expansion does not mean increased military activity at Bodo.

The main contract will be sent out in the spring if the project is approved. Base commander Omdal expects that the project can begin in early summer 1988.

09287

Exercise To Test Capability of Defending Jan Mayen Island

36390006d Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
15 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Jan Mayen: Defense Readiness Test"]

[Text] The ability of the defense forces to defend Jan Mayen will be tested: In one week, Rifle Company Number 1 from Sor-Halogaland Ground Defense Forces will carry out a readiness exercise on the island, which lies 560 nautical miles from the mainland.

The distance can be compared with the stretch between Oslo and Bodo, and this fact alone is one of the most difficult factors that the defense forces must reckon with in defending the island. The problem has already been demonstrated: More Hercules transports are delayed because of fog at the landing place. The aircraft could not land and had to return home.

It takes one or two hours to fly there, and it is uncomfortable for the crew onboard a Hercules. In the middle of the week the rifle company will be flown to Jan Mayen.

As to the defense of the island, the chief of staff of the Sor-Halogaland Ground Defense Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Hans Arne Viken, reminds us that he hopes that Norway will not be alone in the Norwegian Sea in case of war. The rifle company of 40 men would otherwise probably not be enough to throw out an invader from the sea desiring to remain on Jan Mayen, according to information AFTENPOSTEN learned from other sources. Viken told AFTENPOSTEN that the purpose of this week's exercise was mainly to make the men familiar with the island. There are troops from Helgeland that will participate in the defense of Jan Mayen.

09287

Nonsocialists Want 3.5-Percent Increase in Defense Budget

36390006a Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
14 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Nonsocialists Want 3.5 Percent for Defense"]

[Text] The government's proposal for real growth of 3 percent for defense next year will probably be rejected by the Storting. According to information received by AFTENPOSTEN, the nonsocialist majority will unify around an appropriation growth of 3.5 percent. "At the moment we must be careful about easing off on requirements," warned Center Party leader Johan J. Jakobsen.

The Conservative Party also recommends a growth of 3.5 percent in 1988. In that party they say they are surprised that the government is presenting a proposal that they must expect will not get a majority in the Storting.

Divided Opinions

There are divided opinions within both the Christian People's Party and the Center Party about increasing Defense Department appropriations in tight economic times, but indications are that the desire for a 3.5-percent increase is strong. "In the Christian People's Party this issue has not yet been discussed in the Storting group, but we will try to get 3.5-percent growth," it was said.

The Center Party leader, Johan J. Jakobsen, pointed out that since they were only at the beginning of the budget process it would not be correct of him to tie the Storting group down to definite percentages.

Level of Ambition

"I want to emphasize a couple of circumstances that indicate that the level of ambition for the Defense Department should not be reduced next year. We are nearing the end of a defense planning period, and about to start a new planning period. So the time is natural for a basic evaluation of the future growth of the defense budget. Another circumstance is the developments in the international arena. A missile agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States that includes removal of intermediate range missiles will place heavier demands on the conventional part of defense, where there is obviously an imbalance between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact," said Jakobsen, and continued:

"If the two superpowers do not reach agreements in Vienna in the conventional area, a missile agreement will easily lead to stronger emphasis on conventional defenses."

Progressive Party: At Least 3.5 Percent

"The Progressive Party favors a growth in defense appropriations next year of at least 3.5 percent," maintains the acting party chairman, Pal Atle Skjervengen.

09287

Bar Frost Exercise First To Include Women in Combat Role

36390006b Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
24 Sep 87 p 10

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Exercise Bar Frost Concluded: Female NCO's Made a Big Impression"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] Ballangen—Sergeant Solveig Ratchje allowed herself the luxury of a victory smile after the conclusion of Exercise Bar Frost yesterday morning. For the first time she and other female NCO's fought in the frontlines during a field exercise of this size. And the chief of the exercise, Major General Torkel Hovland, told AFTENPOSTEN that the girls could be designated the winners of the exercise. According to the chief of the exercise, they disproved all the counterarguments.

Solveig Ratchje relates that she enjoyed the raids and sabotage missions behind the "enemy" lines as an infantry sergeant in a rifle company. Her next job in the defense forces will be as a company commander at the border station on Helligskog in Skibotn. She will be the first female officer to occupy such a position in an outpost against a possible enemy advancing through Finland.

Joint Exercise

This year there was a greater effort than previously to exercise the Army, Navy, and Air Force jointly.

General Hovland said that more people in the Army now have been trained in amphibious operations. Cooperation between the engineer forces' ferries, assault boat groups and beach groups on the one side and the Naval Home Guard and the Navy on the other, was entirely satisfactory. The general also commended the Air Force contribution. "Coastal waterways have become the new state highways in the north," said Hovland, who added that the anti-aircraft units had proved themselves during Bar Frost, as allied aircraft had provided realistic artillery support to the Army. New radars and anti-aircraft systems of the Robot 70 type were tested, and Hovland said that the 12.7-mm machinegun proved to be well-suited against helicopters.

During Exercise Bar Frost a new type of shelter was demonstrated. Experience shows that the use of such a shelter reduces the number of losses by 90 percent. General Hovland's conclusion is this: "Such a light, mobile shelter, which the infantry soldiers can build

themselves, is an absolute necessity. It is the cheapest way that we can raise combat endurance in the Norwegian forces. Such shelters for two to three brigades will cost no more than a couple of Leopard tanks," he told AFTENPOSTEN. He said that the shelters will give the Army mobility in combat in the frontlines, and increased ability for point defense behind our own lines.

Major General Torkel Hovland does not yet have a report of how much damage there has been to the terrain and private property during the exercise, but his impression is that the damages are no greater than must be expected. He emphasized that the newly established armored battalion had all possible consideration for the civilian population during the exercise.

09287

PORTUGAL

Comments on Relations With U.S. Citizens at Lajes Base

35420121 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 15 Aug 87 p 3

[Article by Cesar Camacho: "Portuguese-American Relations Are Polite But Reserved"]

[Text] Lajes Base has ended up as a "stronghold" combining two different communities—a Portuguese and an American one—that maintain polite but reserved relations with each other.

This definition was given by a high officer who has lived on the perimeters of the base long enough to notice the differences between the two social environments, both of which are characterized by the pattern of the so-called military family. The differences lie in what can be called the "quality of life" of the two groups, and, in the end, it is the dollar that exercises influence and to some extent holds sway.

The American sector has just built a new residential development comprising 150 homes, and is developing a second one of the same size. In the Portuguese part there is still a residential development made up of English barracks dating from the end of World War II and called the "barrels" because of the shape.

In this connection, General Lemos Ferreira told reporters during a visit he arranged at the time of his recent trip to the Azores: "An effort has been made to reorganize and renovate buildings and other infrastructure, and a good part of what has been done was accomplished in the past 10 years, such as the complex for housing enlisted men, and some of the new facilities are no more than 2 years old."

This attempt to eliminate gradually the differences is a question of dignity, along with a real need to create proper living conditions for people who spend virtually

their entire lives on the base, the CEMGFA [Armed Forces chief of staff] general said, adding that the United States "does not give money to the Air Force." The system of cooperation may be reflected in donations of some supplies and equipment, but never in cash.

Some Confusion

"At times there is some confusion when people refer to Lajes Air Base, as it is frequently called Lajes American Base," Gen Lemos Ferreira said. It is actually a Portuguese base, and the United States has negotiated with Portugal rights or facilities to use it.

Portugal is aware of the strategic importance of the Azores, an importance that is part of its national interest, and it is therefore natural that the United States would try to "reduce the cost" of its need to maintain support facilities in the Azores, another officer said.

Meanwhile, the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS learned that, when the Lajes agreement was being renegotiated, the United States attempted to demonstrate the reduced strategic interest and logistic support capabilities of the base. With a view to impressing Portugal and reducing the price it has to pay, the United States dispatched a detachment of field troops from American territory to the Federal Republic of Germany without touching down at the Azores in a period of 48 hours.

However, this military transport capacity of the United States does not carry over to other targeted destinations, such as the Middle East and the Gulf region. Even when the destination is in Europe, a technical stopover in the Azores substantially reduces operating costs, according to experts from the Portuguese Air Force.

As the Portuguese officer said: "It is one thing to be feasible, and another to be cheaper or more expensive in terms of budget costs and operational results."

Gen Lemos Ferreira told DIARIO DE NOTICIAS that, during the colonial war, Lajes Air Base was pushed to the bottom of the list of budget priorities, both in terms of structures granted and operating means.

The country needs to allocate more funds for renovating the base, for the sake of the indispensable dignity to which the Portuguese sector is entitled in view of its own responsibilities, the military officers maintain.

09805/09599

SWEDEN

First Woman Combat Helicopter Officer Completes Training

36500002d Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
29 Sep 87 p 36

[Article by Annika Ortmark]

[Text] The alarm sounded: suspected submarine in Mysingen. Second Lieutenant Anna-Carin Nordlund gritted her teeth as she lugged the heavy depth charges

across the tarmac. She is the first girl to be part of a Swedish helicopter crew, and it was she who was supposed to find the submarine.

Anna-Carin of the helicopter squadron outside Stockholm put on her helmet and could communicate with the rest of the crew. She slipped the green flight vest over her head in a practiced move. Anna-Carin was in charge of the sonar that would detect the "submarine" as DAGENS NYHETER went along on a simulated submarine hunt.

Green braided curtains covered the round windows so the crew could read the sensitive instruments. Sunlight was banned, and it was as dark as a cave when Anna-Carin sat down in front of the instruments showing what the sonar transmitter "saw" under the surface of the water. If it were not for the noise being made by the rotor blades, we might have thought we were in a boat or a bus.

The helicopter lifted off softly and smoothly, and we hardly noticed as we glided out over the water and up to an altitude of 300 meters. The air in the helicopter quickly turned warm, the earphones grew sticky, and the hair around our ears was wet with perspiration. The crewmembers were chatting with each other and with the control tower.

"We want to go out to Mysingen..."

"One thousand feet..."

"Radar out..."

By peeping out through the curtains, we could see a handful of the archipelago's 20,000 islands spread out over the shimmering sea: Ran Island, Nattar Island, Ut Island, Al Island, and others.

"I'm not getting a really clear test picture," said Anna-Carin.

She had trouble adjusting the instruments and was helped by spotter Anders Friman, who was sitting at the radar. He is the one who does the navigating when visibility is poor. He was also the one who would drop the depth bombs after Anna-Carin found the submarine.

Diagonally behind Anna-Carin, the sun-yellow sonar transmitter was suspended in a hole in the floor. The helicopter dropped lower just as carefully as it had taken off, and she paid out the sonar transmitter toward the water. The helicopter was hovering 12 meters away from a real belly flop, and the water's surface was foaming up under its powerful rotor blades.

"Classified as a submarine," said Anders.

Ready for Attack

The helicopter was "right on its target," and the crew prepared for the attack. Codes and course indications followed one upon the other.

"Course 052..."

"Prepare to attack..."

"One thousand four hundred meters remaining..."

"Eight hundred meters remaining..."

The bombs would soon start falling.

"First bomb, second, and third," said Anders.

After a moment of silence, he added:

"We were not able to sink the submarine."

The mood was cheerful, and Anders laughed a little.

The fog had been thick over the bays during the search operation, and that is one of the worst situations to have to work in.

Anna-Carin said: "You get tired, all your senses are taut, and the vibrations are tiring."

In ordinary circumstances, an operation lasts 2 or 3 hours, and we had been out for 20 minutes. There is usually also another helicopter in the vicinity to see whether the operation is successful. Then it was up to Anna-Carin to find the submarine again.

The fruitless submarine search on this particular day is also repeated when the hunt is in earnest, but Anna-Carin believes that someday the Navy will succeed.

"The result of all submarine searches is that we get better and better, and then we really feel motivated to continue," says the 23-year-old native of Orebro, who was the first of the women officers to graduate from officers' school last Christmas.

She took down the military-green curtains, and the sun's rays enlivened the gray interior. The door was opened, and the sea air flowed in to deaden the smell of rubber as we flew back to the base.

Things were deserted at the 1st Helicopter Squadron. Two guys were painting a couple of huts a dull red and did not even turn around when the heavy helicopter thundered in over the tarmac. They are used to it, just like Anna-Carin.

Like a Bus Trip

"It is more or less like climbing into a bus," she said as she pointed to the largest of the Navy's helicopters.

Anna-Carin had begun flying during her basic training at Berga, which is next to the helicopter squadron. She was a conscript NCO for 15 months. After flying a helicopter for the first time, she knew what she wanted to do—it was so much fun.

She entered the Karlskrona Officers' College in 1984 and completed the course last Christmas. Anna-Carin chose to specialize in ASW, and that means that she can also serve on ships. Eventually, she may study to become a spotter, as Anders did.

"Here we are always undergoing training," she said, and she said a casual hello to a few guys in the vicinity.

The rattle of machinegun fire from the woods interrupted the chirping of birds. Detonations and gunfire are noises many people associate with the military. But Anna-Carin has had minimal training with weapons. As she puts it, the Navy is not all that belligerent.

"It is different with the Army: they do more shooting and marching," she said.

Trained to preserve peace or to kill—there are many opinions about the military. But Anna-Carin seldom thinks about the fact that one of the depth bombs may strike a submarine and that the submarine crew may be injured or killed.

"This is a job, so one cannot think that way."

They seldom talk about death in the helicopter squadron—it's just the way things are.

Anna-Carin was accustomed to working with guys even when she left secondary school. She had taken the 4-year technical course, and not many other girls were there. Although the spirit of comradeship with the guys is good and the teamwork is fun, the girls in the service stick together.

"We have to. There are so few girls, and everything is not just peaches and cream," she said with a little knowing smile.

When the workday is over, Anna-Carin climbs out of her uniform and into civilian clothes. There is really only one disadvantage to wearing a uniform on the job.

"We don't get to dress up in nice clothes to come here in the morning, but that makes it all the more fun to put on ordinary clothes after work."

Outside the 1st Helicopter Squadron, Anna-Carin leads an ordinary life, and when the workday is over, her pup soon finds his mistress at home. Elegant or not, the important thing is to put distance between herself and the military life when the gates swing shut behind her.

11798

Proposal for New Army Organization: Cut Back Brigades

36500002b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
20 Sep 87 p 9

[Article by Anders Jorle]

[Text] (TT)—Reduce the military's assault brigades by nearly one-third while simultaneously bringing about substantial improvement in the remaining units.

That is one of the proposals for a new Army organization that is being studied by the Armed Forces. The proposal would also reduce the training period for 10,000 conscripts.

A decision has already been made to phase out two older infantry brigades, but the defense appropriations and technical developments have necessitated even larger cuts in the Swedish Army—the largest in Northern Europe.

It is no longer possible for Sweden to equip 600,000 men with modern materiel.

The Defense Staff is currently sketching out a new, three-tiered organization for the Army.

The most advanced tier will be the assault brigades, the middle tier will consist of territorial defense—currently known as local defense—and the least advanced tier will consist of units for guarding and defending important targets.

It is the conscripts in those guard units whose training period may be reduced in the future.

Minimum Level

“What we are trying to determine now is the minimum number of brigades needed for defense in two directions—for example, an attack on Upper Norrland combined with a coastal invasion somewhere else.”

Work on the wartime organization is currently the center of attention, and the effect that work will have on the peacetime units is unclear.

Military sources have already said that a number of the Army's peacetime regiments will have to be eliminated for economic reasons.

According to one of the plans discussed, the future brigade organization would consist of five Norrland brigades, two mechanized brigades (with armor) for use in Norrland terrain, four mechanized brigades for use in southern and central Sweden, two armored brigades chiefly for the defense of Skane, and five infantry brigades.

That would mean a total of 18 brigades instead of the nearly 30 we have now.

11798

Home Guard Adding Platoons for Chemical, Nuclear Defense

36500006a Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
4 Oct 87 p 12

[Text] (TT)—The number of Home Guard areas will be reduced. Platoons will be added in some Home Guard districts for chemical and nuclear defense.

This is contained in a new plan for the future Home Guard.

“The reductions will take the local ties of Home Guard personnel into consideration so that home-towns ties are not broken,” Robert Lugn, the national commander of the Home Guard, promised at the national reunion of Home Guard officers in Garpenberg on Saturday.

The plan also reveals that Home Guard leadership organs will be tailor-made for their tasks.

If the plan drawn up by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces [OB] for the Army in the period 1988-93 is carried out there will be radical cuts in the number of local defense units and several of the older infantry brigades will disappear altogether. This will make it possible for the Home Guard to acquire more materiel and younger conscript officers.

The work to develop special guard groups and incident platoons in the Home Guard is proceeding. It will be possible to send them in to deal with sabotage and peacetime border violations.

During the next 5-year period 1 billion kronor will be spent on the Home Guard. That will be enough to maintain a volunteer army of 120,000 men in constant combat readiness.

06578

Book 'Nordic Countries and U.S. Maritime Strategy' Reviewed

36500006c Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
7 Oct 87 p 2

[Commentary by Olof Santesson: "Tunnel Vision and Conjectures About Superpower Strategy"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] If the Soviet Union combats advanced American military operations by occupying all of Norway, U.S. aircraft carriers (in circle [illustration not included]) would be forced to withdraw. The white space is the area in which neither side would be able to maintain ocean supremacy. (From "Nordic Countries and U.S. Maritime Strategy")

Tension in northern waters should not be exaggerated. Listeners got to consider this wise rule was during Monday evening's joint Norwegian-Swedish radio broadcast on the topic "Allied and Nonaligned."

But representatives of the Norwegian and Swedish security bureaucracies were a little too forceful in rejecting suggestions or assertions that their countries could become caught between the superpowers.

They might not have been able to present such a simple argument if they had been confronted with a new strategic study from the Defense Research Institute [FOA] by conflict researcher Ola Tunander on "Nordic Countries and U.S. Maritime Strategy." It contains detailed arguments and some thought-provoking reflections on the changed strategic situation in the Nordic region.

But those who were questioned did not just claim that Wilhelm Agrell's scenario of the superpower conflict which could spread from the Persian Gulf up to northern ocean areas lacked general credibility. The gentlemen were more concrete than that.

Why should the United States escalate tension in an area where the Soviet Union has such a strong position? That should be the last thing it would do, the Norwegians said. Although the only alternative Sweden's Supreme Commander [OB], Bengt Gustafsson, could come up with was the Baltic straits.

One can understand that when they are questioned jointly official representatives of Norway and Sweden like to choose their words carefully and avoid speculating too deeply on the content of the superpowers' more or less overt strategies.

In the radio broadcast it was Agrell who tried to fuel the debate by calling the Nordic region a new central confrontation area and claiming forcefully that Sweden has reduced the possibilities of remaining outside a conflict;

his Norwegian research colleague, Nils-Petter Gleditsch, was unusually pallid that evening, except for some discreet questioning of Norway's independence once a conflict has broken out.

The others had things to say that were obviously important—Undersecretary Pierre Schori talked about the need for a balance between the superpowers at a low level, OB dealt with whether Swedish security policy has failed and will have to be revised if the country ends up in a war—but never grappled with the question of the Nordic region's role between the superpowers.

One must realize that it is intellectuals of Agrell's and Tunander's matador type who get really fired up by discussing troublesome conflict patterns.

It will be interesting to see what traces Tunander's commissioned study leaves when it now begins its long journey from one general defense authority to another.

He has evidently read carefully everything that has been written about the new U.S. maritime strategy, officially a Reagan-era method of deterring the other side from conducting operations in other parts of the world by means of advanced operations aimed at vulnerable Soviet points.

The problem for Norway and Sweden is that such a strategy in our part of the world could provoke the Soviet Union into countermeasures that would be dangerous for us. It was this that national representatives did not want to talk too much about during Monday evening's radio broadcast.

In contrast to the invited American democrats at the FOA seminar last week, Tunander sees the American aircraft carrier forces in the Norwegian Sea as a direct threat, in the event of war, to the Soviet base strongholds on the Kola peninsula. He does point out difficulties in carrying out both submarine searches and sea-borne aircraft operations because of the climate, but he feels that the Soviet Union must still feel uncertain about the true U.S. capability.

By comparing different scenarios, Tunander concludes that a Soviet counteraction could only be carried out in the form of a widespread surprise attack.

It is easy to follow the argument up to this point. It is harder to believe in Tunander's assurances that in the event of a Soviet attack aimed at seizing Swedish territory the United States would immediately be drawn into a Swedish-Russian war. The feeling is that the United States will protect Norway, but can it be taken for granted that the Americans would find the proper resources to counteract a Soviet invasion quickly?

Here Tunander states that Sweden cannot rely on the "marginal theory" (that a superpower has only limited resources for dealing with a move against us); both power blocs assume that the other side possesses resources that are substantially greater than those Sweden has!

But Tunander is most speculative when he deals with a theme that is an old favorite—that Sweden is already in a gray area, exposed to "certain, though ambiguous" Soviet activities, in other words submarine incursions. In turn this involves the risk of leading to corresponding American tactics, in Tunander's view.

He regards the violations as a peacetime Soviet warning signal to the United States not to put too much pressure on norther strongholds. He finds the "evidence" for that in his general argument and in various Soviet statements, obviously just because they are ambiguous; here the study is a poor submarine book.

In this is true wouldn't we have noticed signs in the notoriously talkative United States that people there had perceived Tunander's Soviet signals? The lack of real American involvement in precisely this issue is something that the submarine theoreticians have never been able to explain.

But at any rate the Soviet admiral who was interviewed during the broadcast did everything he could to place his country in a dubious light with his pompous comments on the violations.

06578

Columnist Reviews Work in English on 'Soviet Subs in Swedish Waters

36500006b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
6 Oct 87 p 2

[Commentary by Olof Santesson: "Risk That Collection of Sub Clippings Could Become Standard Work"]

[Text] The search for foreign underwater activity in Swedish waters has created a new occupation. Judging from the praise he has received abroad Milton Leitenberg has carried out an important piece of research.

His book, *Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters, 1980-1986* (Praeger Press), ends with a quite detailed discussion of Soviet military motives for violating Swedish waters. This is based primarily on an account of familiar cavalier and/or acrimonious Soviet views of Sweden's conduct.

But here Leitenberg adds some new elements to the Swedish discussion by reporting western evaluations of what the author calls "the first Soviet military initiative against a West European state since the Berlin crisis of 1960-61"; among other things the possibilities involved in changes in Soviet doctrine at the beginning of the 1980's are discussed.

But Leitenberg's most important message seems to be a clear and unambiguous disapproval of the actions of the Swedish government.

This is problematic, not because the criticism is insulting and embarrassing to Sweden but because the author does not substantiate his assertions in any meaningful way—or in any way at all.

It certainly seems to Leitenberg that there is an abundance of suspicion concerning the failure of the Swedish government and/or the appropriate authorities to use force against intruding submarines.

It is obvious that the nonsocialist parties—in the opposition—called for a tougher Swedish response to the Soviet Union on various occasions than a Social Democratic government dared to make or found appropriate.

An open report written in the spring of 1984 and intended for Foreign Ministry use made it clear that Olof Palme did not have one of his greatest moments and lacked strength when he met with then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in January 1984.

Leitenberg really goes farther than a Swedish debater would, especially when he claims that Sweden should have identified the Soviet Union as a disturber of the peace on the basis of a long list of submarine alarms with a pattern resembling that in the Harsfjarden incident.

But when Milton Leitenberg presents his accusations against the Palme government and the military leadership he does so without having made any attempt to go into these matters in depth.

A careful investigator should not be content to say that it was "undoubtedly" the action of Navy officers in the fall of 1985 that led Palme to sharpen his tone in December; it would have been reasonable to look for material to support his hypothesis—and if he could not find any he should have discarded it.

"The government would not use (military) power in the only way that would have ended the intrusions more quickly—to seriously damage or sink an intruding submarine," Leitenberg writes.

What is this assertion based on?

The extensive notes show that of course Leitenberg made use of official material—the Supreme Commander's quarterly surveys, the Submarine Defense Commission's report, etc.—but the major share of the material, surprisingly enough, simply comes from a large collection of clippings; among other things the author has read carefully through many back issues of *Marinnytt* [*Navy News*].

Leitenberg gets his facts mainly from newspaper accounts. Of course that is flattering for us, but how in the world can a researcher routinely rely on second-hand sources and still claim that indisputable facts are involved?

On two or three occasions, when *Dagens Nyheter* editorials are quoted, Leitenberg has either translated phrases incorrectly or has evidently not understood them. He refers to an episode from the Karlskrona search in 1984 when it was reported that a submarine was chased by various units for 30 minutes, but neglects to add that the whole event was regarded as uncertain when it was evaluated.

There is nothing to suggest that Milton Leitenberg has once asked himself whether this vast number of reported violations really took place—or if he should use extreme caution in interpreting the OB's commentaries. He completely ignores unclear statements about propeller noises, keel tracks, etc. In general he is satisfied with daily newspaper reports as if they provide the facts.

Even so the highly acclaimed British conflict researcher, Lawrence Freedman, put his reputation on the line by stating in a preface that Milton Leitenberg has made an

important research contribution. Although Freedman may be somewhat more cautious than appears at first glance he sums up by calling the work a valuable handbook.

Other western experts go farther in praising Leitenberg and refer on the book jacket to a "definitive analysis" and a "balanced reconstruction."

One might ask if these frequently consulted authorities are as casual in other cases about approving texts on subjects they are not familiar with. The idea is disturbing.

The fact remains that here is an American—recently associated with the Foreign Policy Institute—who has received international support for his submarine concoction. Without examining the facts for himself at all he has produced what unfortunately runs the risk of being the outside world's definitive picture of a Swedish security fiasco.

The fact that Milton Leitenberg did such an inferior job of research is obviously not important but it needs to be said anyway.

06578

TURKEY

Preparations for Oil Trade Deregulation

35540294c Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish

14 Jul 87 pp 1, 10

[Report by Nurhan Yonezer]

[Text] Ankara—Studies have begun to regulate the oil trade. Technical studies being conducted by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources are aimed at introducing deregulation in the domestic and foreign trade in oil as has happened in other fields.

Initially, there will be a stage-by-stage deregulation of the prices and the import and export of oil products subject to import surcharges, such as fuel oil, gas, diesel oil, and kerosenes. Later on, the Oil Office and the refineries shall be privatized together and full deregulation introduced. In the interim, the state will carry out the task stabilization sales as in the case of the Meat and Fish Association.

The studies conducted by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources dwell specifically on introducing a system that will prevent upsetting the existing balance in oil prices in Turkey and the country's relations with countries with which it has trade relations founded on oil.

Highly-placed officials of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources have told DUNYA that these studies have been initiated as a result of the current policy of a deregulated market, that the time has come for the state to withdraw from the oil trade, and that the technical studies will be completed by October. The same officials have said that once these studies are assessed by the government, an executive order will be issued concerning the new system, and that the deregulation of the oil trade is expected to go into effect at the beginning of the new year.

The officials said that there are differences between Turkey's oil pricing policy in Turkey and those of other countries, recalling that while the prices in Europe are regulated by taxes, this function is performed in Turkey by the Oil Price Stability Fund. Referring to the very long history of this Fund, the officials said: "There is an established order in practices concerning oil in Turkey. We shall therefore strive to introduce an arrangement that will not risk upsetting this order and making things worse."

Ministry officials recalled that the state has a monopoly in the imports and exports of a number of oil products—such as fuel oil, gas, diesel oil, and kerosenes—which are subject to the [Oil Price Stability] Fund and it is the state that regulates their prices, and said that the prices of such oil products as asphalt which are not subject to the

Fund are [already] deregulated. The officials explained that what is under consideration is not the deregulation of all oil product prices, saying:

"Currently we have a refinery surplus in some oil products and a shortage in others. We are planning to remedy this situation. Thus, for example, we have a refinery surplus in fuel-oil. This surplus may be eliminated by the deregulation of foreign trade and prices. Furthermore, certain reductions in quantity can also be introduced. [sentence as published] The proportions in these matters are not clear. There will be a steady introduction of deregulation in the oil products subject to the provisions of the Fund. The stages in this process shall be monitored in the light of the needs of the country and of our citizens, and full deregulation will come in due course. To take one example, IPC [presumably a misprint of LPG, a commodity widely used as a home fuel] is subsidized; to stop this subsidy abruptly would cause widespread hardship among our people.

Another issue is that of Turkey's relations with the countries with which it has oil-based trade relations. This is very important in the case of some Middle East countries as the crude oil we import from them constitutes the guarantee of our exports to them. We attach great importance to this guarantee factor. As a result, we have in mind a gradual deregulation by products. The new system to be introduced must absolutely be such that it will not hurt Turkey's interests and its bilateral relations."

Ministry officials have argued that the partial deregulation to be introduced will not cause great fluctuations in prices. Pointing out that the oil Turkey currently imports under bilateral agreements is at prices below both official prices and the spot market, the officials said: "The private sector cannot suddenly go and find cheaper oil. Besides, as the private sector's oil will be processed at the [state-owned] refineries in the initial stage, the prices will be determined—in a sense—by the state. Therefore, there will not be large-scale increases in oil prices."

The officials pointed out that while the state is currently in charge of the importation of such products as asphalt which are not subject to the Fund, their prices are not regulated, and said that a certain increase may be expected in the prices of the products not subject to the Fund once the new measures go into force.

The officials stated that "one should not expect great profits in this connection," saying: "This practice has been conceived entirely in the spirit of a free market economy. As the state will carry on stabilization sales for some time and deregulation will be introduced in stages, one should not think that the private sector will make any large-scale profits."

On the other hand, the deregulation of the oil prices in stages constitutes one of the bases for the privatization of the oil sector. When it is recalled that the joint privatization of the Oil Office and the refineries is under consideration in the long term, the deregulation of the oil prices may be regarded as the beginning of privatization.

Giving their views on the subject, officials of the Turkish Oil Refineries Ltd [TUPRAS] have said that there are plans for the privatization of the Oil Office and the refineries also, adding: "But the profit margins of these are quite thin. It is feared there may not be much demand for their shares. The transfer of these establishments to the private sector will be implemented after their profit margins have been improved. Once this is over, there will be deregulation in its fullest sense in the oil sector as the private sector will be in control of both the distribution network and the refineries."

On the other hand, it is pointed out that while partial deregulation is not expected to cause price increases in oil products, it may—while it lasts—enable contracting firms with business in the Middle East to do barter trade. Recalling that this has been tried before, officials say that the private sector may thus revive the practice. Another development that is expected to accompany the new measures is described as "new incentives for increasing exports of refinery surpluses." It is said that the decisions on this issue may be taken in the light of developments after the measures in question have gone into effect. It is pointed out that foreign oil companies like Shell, Mobil, and BP—which even now compete to reduce the market share of the Oil Office—may considerably extend their marketing networks and increase their profits.

13184/9738

Banks Deregulate Deposit Interest

35540294a Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish
7 Jul 87 pp 1, 13

[Report by Abdurrahman Yildirim]

[Text] On the first day of the deregulation of the deposit interest rates, Pamukbank was offering 56 percent on 1-year term deposits, Demmirbank 50 percent, and Akbank, Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi, Garanti Bankasi, Tobank, and Titibank—which observed a gentleman's agreement—offered 48 percent interest. On the other hand, the Anadolu Bankasi, Iktisat Bankasi, and Imar Bankasi have yet to announce their rates. Pamukbank, which was "persuaded" to adopt a 48 percent interest rate yesterday, is expected to implement the new rate as of tomorrow.

It is understood that on the first day of the deregulation of the rates, the depositors were quietly seeking the bank with the highest rate of interest. It is reported that the

depositors were bargaining with banks offering 48 percent, asking if more could not be offered, and refraining from investing their money.

Banking circles commenting on the first day of the deregulated interest rates said that, unlike on previous occasions, investors were not rushing into the banks nor did they bring their money within the hour to invest; they were engaging in research instead. Banking circles commented that the depositors had alternatives outside the banking system and may exercise their options, saying "The savers are weighing things up."

Pamukbank, which offered 56 percent as previously announced—rather than sticking to the 48 percent under the gentleman's agreement, it had entered—commented that "things are going very well."

The bank's officials said that they had received no instructions from the general manager of the bank to offer 48 percent instead of 56 percent interest and that they would hold their present course unless otherwise instructed. It is expected that Pamukbank, which was "persuaded" to adopt the 48 percent rate at the meeting of the Union of Banks in Ankara yesterday, will continue with the 56 percent rate today and drop this to the gentleman's agreement level tomorrow. Haluk Dayigil, director general of Demirbank, which offered 50 percent interest which exceeds the level agreed on in the gentleman's agreement, said that his bank had taken an "opportunistic" approach to the market and that if Pamukbank continued to offer 56 percent, his own bank would follow it. Dayigil said that his bank would stick to its present course until it has achieved its set target of deposits.

Officials of Akbank, the Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi, Garanti Bankasi, Tobank, and Titibank, which have been offering an interest rate of 48 percent, have said that on the first day of the implementation of the new rate customers have been doing less investing and more researching, maintaining a policy of "wait and see." The officials have also voiced the opinion that Pamukbank's advertisements in the press about "a good rate of interest" has violated the gentleman's agreement.

Metin Boysan, director general of Titibank, said that it is less than crystal clear how deregulation should have been implemented, and that one bank has failed to abide by the agreement by its use of the slogan "good rate of interest," and that this amounts to a violation of the earlier agreement on the subject. Metin Boysan said that his bank will follow the major banks in setting its own interest rates, that it will not go above 48 percent, and did not expect a sharp competition to develop in the interest rates.

13184/9738

Export List of Commodities for USSR
35540294b Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish
15 Jul 87 p 4

[Text] With the flow of Soviet natural gas to our country, new items have been added to the list of potential Turkish export goods. Under the Turkish-Soviet natural gas agreement, 65-70 percent cost of the gas will be paid in goods.

Therefore, the value of the goods to pay for this percentage of the cost of the 600 million cubic meters of gas that we will buy in 1987 alone will amount to 35-40 million dollars. The goods that we shall offer to meet this sum range from silver metal to lead-acid batteries, and from lead to machinery for the woolen textile industry.

Enver Huseyinov, the trade representative in Istanbul of the office of the trade representative at the USSR embassy, has said the following on the latest developments on

this subject: "The volume of natural gas to be sold by the Soviet Union to Turkey shall reach 5-6 billion cubic meters by 1993. The rate of payment for this gas will be determined by the corresponding world prices for oil. If the price of oil goes up, so will the price of gas."

[Boxed item]

What the Soviets want to buy from us: agricultural produce: grains, soya, soya oil, olive oil, meat, mohair; minerals: silver, zinc concentrate, sheet aluminum, lead; industrial products: lead-acid batteries, superphosphate, phosphoric acid, high-pressure hoses, drive belts for machinery, agricultural chemicals, ceramic products, raw materials for paints, various organic paints and synthetic paints, cord fabric [for tires], machinery for woolen apparel, and electric motors.

13184/9738

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Trend Toward Increasing Xenophobia Seen in Nordic Countries

36200003 Bonn DIE WELT in German 23 Sep 87 p 6

[Article by Alfred Zaenker: "Xenophobia Blanketing Scandinavia"]

[Text] In liberal, cosmopolitan northern Europe there are mounting indications of xenophobic, extremist trends directed against the massive influx of asylum seekers, principally from Asia. Up to this point, the Scandinavian countries had been particularly active in arguing in favor of the most liberal asylum policy possible and had been in the forefront of the fight against "racism." But now the tolerance threshold of their own peoples has been crossed. The results of the most recent elections in Norway and Denmark provided evidence of this. In both countries, the staunchest right-wing and left-wing opponents of the asylum seekers scored substantial gains and thus became a power factor in the national political arena.

In Norway, the far right liberal Progress Party unexpectedly gained the number three spot in the 14 September local elections. 4 years ago, it had captured less than six percent of the vote. This time, it received 12 percent—at the expense of the ruling Labor Party and the opposition moderates. In Oslo and in other cities, it captured up to 20 percent of the vote, particularly in working class areas and in districts with large foreign populations. Many first-time voters also cast their ballot for the Progress Party. In school elections held earlier, 20 percent of the young people had voted for the Progress Party.

The success of this protest party is the work of 43-year-old Carl Hagen, a powerful and photogenic speaker, who is its leader. Originally, Hagen had come out against Norway's overblown social welfare and taxation system. But in this election campaign he focused on the asylum seeker problem. Hagen warned against an "Islamization" of Norway, alluding to the multitude of Pakistanis and Iranians which the Norwegians find difficult to get used to. Thus far, Hagen's party holds only two seats in the Storting; but these two seats are crucial in that neither the 78 moderates, nor the 77 members of the left command an absolute majority in the 157-seat parliament.

Hagen also gained political stature by not agreeing to cast his liberalist views regarding the economy and the tax system aside and throw his support to the then middle-of-the-road coalition. As a consequence, the Labor Party, led by Ms Brundtland, came to power in May 1986. In June of this year, Hagen refused to take part in a questionable maneuver by the opposition aimed at bringing the Brundtland government down. At this juncture, Hagen is poised in

a most enviable position for the 1989 parliamentary elections. No one can govern in Oslo without him. The other parties are in the process of adjusting to the "voice of the people" on the asylum issue.

On 8 September, just prior to the Norwegian elections, Danish tax protester Mogens Glistrup and his Progress Party had made gains in the Folketing elections while the Conservatives and Social Democrats suffered losses. Just like Hagen's party in Oslo, Glistrup's party now holds the balance in parliament. Without it, neither the right, nor the left can muster a majority in the parliament. The middle-of-the-road coalition led by Conservative [Poul] Schluter will now have to call on the "Progressives" for help, if the need arises.

During the campaign, Glistrup's party likewise made use of thinly veiled racist terminology to attack the asylum seekers and went on to profit from the electorate's latent sentiments of xenophobia. "We want no more of these fancy refugees who multiply like rats," Glistrup cried. "We have no intention of becoming the Lebanon of Europe." On the left, Preben Moeller-Hansen, a former communist head of the merchant seamen's union, used similarly nationalistic language to attack the asylum seekers. His new "Common Cause" party gained four seats in the Folketing on the first try. During the course of the campaign, the social democrats shifted ground, saying that Denmark must not permit asylum seekers to overrun it. Copenhagen sources assert that social democratic losses would have been even greater, if the party had not made this adjustment.

In Sweden, too, this new political message has not gone unnoticed. Georg Andersson, the Swedish minister of immigration, says that his government is "very concerned" about the outcome of the elections in Norway and Denmark but that Sweden intends to hold to its "generous and humane policies regarding refugees." In Sweden, which is less mobile politically, no "Progress Party" has as yet been established; but it is no secret that uneasiness and opposition to the asylum seekers are mounting—among young people as much as anywhere. There is a fear of conflict and possible clashes.

The situation in Finland is less problematical and more stable under the grand blue-and-red coalition headed by Conservative Harri Holkeri. The Finns have never left any doubt about the fact that they intend to remain a northern nation with a homogeneous population. Giving way to political pressure by its neighbors, Finland has now raised its annual quota for refugees from 100 to 200. But the Helsinki government reserves the right to make its own selection. It now proposes to admit a small number of Chileans. As far as Finland is concerned, the events in Denmark and Norway prove the wisdom of its circumspect handling of the refugee issue.

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